QUESTIONING THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO MARRY
JOSEPH A. PULL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment' would insert the word
"marriage" into the United States Constitution for the first time. This
would be something of an uneasy addition to the document, for the
Constitution currently leaves government regulation of domestic
relations nearly unmentioned. 2 Further, a constitutional policy of
leaving domestic relations laws largely to the discretion of the state
legislatures has been observed for two centuries and has reached quasiconstitutional status as a bedrock element of federalism jurisprudence.'

* Law Clerk, The Honorable James B. Loken, Chief Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; J.D., 2006, Yale Law School. I thank Professor Robert Burt
for his generous assistance with this topic; his expertise was valuable, and his fundamental
disagreement with my conclusions provided helpful perspective.
1. Multiple resolutions have been introduced in Congress to define marriage. For
example, in the 109th Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 1 states "Marriage in the United
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor
the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman." Marriage
Protection Amendment, S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). Companion legislation
introduced in the House, House Joint Resolution 88, 109th Congress § 2 (2006), uses identical
language. Similar legislation was introduced in the 108th Congress; one example provides
that "Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups." H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003).
2. The two exceptions to this statement are the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, and the provisions relating to slavery, U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause requires states to give effect to the "public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings" (including marriages) of other states. The slavery provisions are essentially
irrelevant today, but slavery was considered a "domestic relationship" prior to the Civil War.
3. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) ("One of the
principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of
domestic relations. Long ago we observed that '[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations
of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of
the United States.' So strong is our deference to state law in this area that we have
recognized a 'domestic relations exception' that 'divests the federal courts of power to issue
divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees."' (citations omitted)); United States v. Morrison,
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Yet the federal courts are not new to controversy over marriage.
Over the years they have dealt with marriage law in at least two
contexts. One is disputes arising on land administered directly by the
federal government, such as non-state territories and the District of
Columbia. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has found
and enforced nontextual constitutional protection for marriage under
the doctrine of the "fundamental right to marry."
Thus, a federal marriage amendment, if passed, would not launch
the Court into completely uncharted constitutional wilderness; rather, it
would reshape a constitutional landscape that already has some
contours defined. But this is a charged and potentially dynamic
landscape, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding same-sex
marriage.
In this Article, I consider the current state of the
constitutional marriage landscape.
I argue that the idea of a
"fundamental right to marry" contains a debilitating internal
contradiction: the notion of a fundamental right implies a firm
entitlement that the state cannot deny, define, or disrespect, but
marriage boundaries in the United States have always been subject to
near plenary state definition and control, which deny some marriages
and refuse to give legal effect to others.4 What can a "right to marry"
protecting individuals against the state possibly mean when the state
itself determines what this thing called "marriage" is?
The contradiction has long lurked beneath the surface of the
Supreme Court's marriage rhetoric but has only recently become
apparent as a problem for the Court in deciding cases. Consideration of
that problem in the context of a vastly changed modern constitutional
landscape, where privacy-related rights often receive significant
protection, forces the conclusion that the Court's past analyses of
marriage under the Constitution are largely unhelpful for untangling the

529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (rejecting petitioners' argument because it "will not limit
Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well
to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of
marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant");
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992).
4. By "boundaries" of marriage I mean the substantive and procedural rules that define
marriage as a concept: who is eligible to marry; whom they are eligible to marry; what rituals
are necessary to create a marriage; what rights are granted by marriage, both between
spouses and between a spouse and the state; what obligations marriage imposes, both
between spouses and between a spouse and the state or other social actors; what conditions
allow the termination of a marriage; etc. All of these are "boundary" issues in the sense that
they describe where marriage begins and where it ends-what it means and what it does not
mean.
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dilemma of what a "fundamental right to marry" can possibly mean.
Rather, the puzzle must be understood through the historical context
in which it arose. The tension between state regulation of marriage and
the idea of marriage as a right has existed since the Founding. In the
early and middle republic, the tension had little significance because the
same force that gave rise to notions of a right to marry also motivated
state definitions of the legal boundaries of marriage-the religious
dictates of the Christian tradition carried to America by English
colonists.
Eventually, however, the social consensus that church
tradition should define state marriage policy eroded, and individual
rights claims that challenged the content of state marriage regulation
began to receive sympathetic hearings from courts rather than being
dismissively slapped down as unreasonable. When courts began giving
serious consideration to such claims, the idea of a fundamental right to
marry gained the potential for enormous constitutional and social
power, and the long-dormant tension between marriage as a right and
legal marriage as a creation of the state awoke.
The Christian understanding that undergirded the original idea of a
fundamental right to marry has mostly been discarded, both in
American social norms and in American law. The reality that society
and the courts have rejected the theoretical foundation of the traditional
right to marry should force the Supreme Court to develop a new
account of the right to marry. However, analysis of the abstract concept
"marriage" suggests that development of such an account is a difficult,
perhaps impossible, task. Separating out the various ways in which the
word "marriage" is used (both in common parlance and in legal
rhetoric) shows "marriage" to carry several different meanings, each of
which has different implications for a fundamental right to marry.
However, no satisfying, principled method of choosing a particular
account of "marriage" to be the constitutionally protected one exists.
Only the simplest meaning of "marriage"-its manifestation as a
personal relationship between particular individuals-is justifiable as a
fundamental right if the Court is to use a non-ideological approach in
determining what the constitutional right to marry means.
My conclusion, then, is that the Supreme Court's "fundamental right
to marry" needs to be reinterpreted as a negative liberty-a claim of
individual autonomy against the encroaching hand of the state-rather
than a positive right5 that obligates the state to provide all persons a
5. See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 863-68
(2001).
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particular set of options under the heading "marriage." Only in this way
can the right be given content without that content being simply the
aggregate policy preferences of a five-member majority of the sitting
Justices.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE CASES: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO
MARRY

A. Groundwork
Over the past 150 years, the Supreme Court has developed a
jurisprudence of a fundamental constitutional right to "marry" and to
"marriage." The process started at least as far back as 1877, when
Justice Strong wrote for the Court, "Marriage is everywhere regarded as
a civil contract. Statutes in many of the States, it is true, regulate the
mode of entering into the contract, but they do not confer the right."6
Strong's opinion also referred to the "common-law right to form the
marriage relation by words of present assent" and the "common right"
7
to marry.
In 1923, during the heyday of its first notorious foray into the realm
of "substantive due process,",8 the Court declared in Meyer v. Nebraska:
Without doubt, [constitutionally protected liberty]
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual.., to marry, establish a
home and bring up children. .. and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 9
Meyer argued that some restrictions on marriage would be
unconstitutional, using the arrangement in Plato's Republic (where
wives and children are held in common) as an example."
By 1942 the Lochner era was over, but the idea of marriage as a
nontextual constitutional right persisted. In Skinner v. Oklahoma
Justice Douglas wrote for the majority, "We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
6. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78 (1877) (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 79, 81.
8. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
10. Id. at 401-02.
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and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race."" Douglas' identification of marriage and procreation with
each other was an old sentiment, but it was soon to be challenged and
rejected in an opinion written by Douglas himself-the majority
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut12
During the 1960s the Supreme Court inaugurated the field of
modern privacy jurisprudence, and the Court instinctively gathered the
right to marry into this new constitutional structure. In 1965, the Court
used "the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship" to
justify striking down a state ban on the use of contraceptives in
Griswold.3
This decision, which deployed expansive language
valorizing marriage to justify its holding barring the states from
interfering with the intimate aspects of marriage, severed procreation
from marriage by granting married persons a constitutional right to
prevent conception.' Justice Douglas concluded the Griswold opinion
with an extraneous paean to marriage that did not relate to
contraceptive use, but which the Court would find itself regularly
quoting when deciding other marriage cases in the succeeding decades:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it

11. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. Id. at 486.
14. Within seven years the Court revealed that marriage was not really the source of the
privacy right justifying Griswold's holding. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the
Court used equal-protection arguments to extend constitutional privacy protection to cover
the use of contraceptives by unmarried couples as well.
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would
be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453.
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is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions."
B. Genesis

Two years later, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court declared marriage
to be a constitutional liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
because "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." 16 Like the Griswold ode to marriage, though, the Loving
reference to "freedom to marry" was entirely unnecessary for the
Court's holding.17 Ten-and-a-half pages of the eleven-page Loving
opinion developed an equal protection analysis striking down Virginia's
antimiscegenation law on the simple ground that the law constituted
invidious racial discrimination. The "freedom to marry" language
appeared in a separate, two-paragraph section tacked on to the end of
the opinion that did not in any way affect the outcome of the case. Its
only significance was the fact that it placed the idea of "freedom to
marry" into a Supreme Court decision that found a state marital
regulation unconstitutional.
It would take eleven years for the Court to expand on Loving and
decide another case striking down a state regulation of marriage because
of the right to marry. In the interval, however, references to the right or
freedom to marry began popping up in the U.S. Reports. In 1971, the
Justices decided that the Due Process Clause prohibited states from
allowing court fees to prevent indigent persons from filing for divorce.
"[M]arriage involves interests of basic importance in our society," said
the majority.'8 Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court took pains to
clarify that it did not hold access to the courts to be a fundamental right
in all circumstances, but only in this case where court access was "the
exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human

15. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
16. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
17. "[Loving] could have rested solely on the ground that the statutes discriminated on
the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 383 (1978). "But for this expansive rhetoric, which ...went beyond what the decision of
the case at hand actually required, Loving v. Virginia would have been an unremarkable
application of the Equal Protection Clause ....But with this language, the case casts doubt
on the validity of much state regulation of marriage." MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WESTERN EUROPE 81 (1989).

18. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371. 376 (1971).
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relationship."19 In 1973, the Court mentioned the right to marry in Roe
v. Wade.20 In 1974, the right appeared in Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur." In 1977, the Court referred to the right to marry in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland2 2 and in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Familiesfor Equality & Reform.23
Also decided in 1977 was Califano v. Jobst, which appeared to trim
back the implications of the right to marry. 24 The Court upheld federal

rules terminating a dependent person's Social Security benefits if he or
she married someone who was ineligible for the same benefits. In effect,
the federal government was allowed to penalize someone for marrying.
C. Fruition
However, later in the same 1977-78 Term the decision in Zablocki v.
Redhail2 shoved Jobst aside in the pantheon of the constitutional
marriage cases. In Zablocki, the Supreme Court's scattered historical

references to a right to marry coalesced around the doctrinal right-tomarry nucleus established in Loving. The Zablocki opinion attempted
to constitutionally anchor the right to marry and bring order to the

doctrine by comprehensively setting forth the reasons for recognizing a
fundamental right to marry.
The facts of Zablocki involved a Wisconsin statute which provided
that Wisconsin residents having court-ordered obligations to pay child

support could not marry unless they first proved they were current in
paying the support. Plaintiff Roger Redhail was $3700 delinquent in his
child support payments, so the county clerk denied him a marriage
license. He sued, claiming the statute violated his constitutional rights.
19. Id. at 382-83.
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). "[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy ....
[This personal privacy] right has some extension to activities relating to
marriage ....
Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
21. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). "This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" Id. at 639-40.
22. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). "This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by
the... Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 499 (plurality opinion) (quoting LaFleur,414 U.S. at
639-40).
23. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). "The individual's freedom to marry and reproduce is 'older
than the Bill of Rights."' Id. at 845 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
24. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
25. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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A three-judge district court applied strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause on the grounds the statute infringed the fundamental
right to marry; the panel then held the statute unconstitutional. On
26
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on equal protection grounds.
Justice Marshall summarized the Court's decision, "Appellee
defends the lower court's equal protection holding and, in the
alternative, urges affirmance of the District Court's judgment on the
ground that the statute does not satisfy the requirements of substantive
due process. We agree with the District Court that the statute violates
the Equal Protection Clause., 27 He then launched into his analysis. "In
evaluating [the statute] under the Equal Protection Clause, 'we must
first determine what burden of justification the classification created
thereby must meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the
individual interests affected."' 28 Here, the burden of justification was a
"'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in support of the
classification"29 because "the right to marry is of fundamental

importance.,

Marshall explained why the right to marry was of fundamental
importance and required such a "critical examination. "'
He cited
Loving as establishing "a fundamental liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, the freedom to marry,"3 1 and then deployed a long list
of reasons for considering marriage a fundamental right: marriage's
''vital" role in "the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"; its
necessity "to our very existence and survival"; its status as "the most
important relation in life" and "the foundation of the family and of
society"; its status as "part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"; the fact that it
"involves interests of basic importance in our society"; its "associational
interests"; its role as the foundation of family life (which has its own
privacy protections); and its role in legalizing sexual relations.3 2 After
establishing the "fundamental" status of the freedom to marry in this
way, Marshall accommodated Califano v. Jobst by allowing that the
government may impose "reasonable regulations that do not

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383 (quoting Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974)).
Id. (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383-86.
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significantly 33interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship.,
Returning to the statute, Marshall concluded that it "absolutely
prevented" some people from being able to marry merely because of
insufficient "financial means., 34 Applying the standard of review to his
determination that the statute implicated constitutionally protected
interests, Marshall asked what purpose the classification served: "When
a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests."35 He rejected Wisconsin's argument that the
classification allowed for "opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the
necessity of fulfilling his prior [child] support obligations" because there
was no reason to continue to deny marriage once an applicant received
such counseling, and he rejected the State's argument that the
classification justifiably furthered the well-being of the child-beneficiary
of the support obligation because the marriage prohibition did not
directly collect money for the support beneficiaries and because the
state had other means for enforcing the support obligation. 6 Having
found the offered rationalization for the statute unsatisfactory, Marshall
held it unconstitutional.3"
The Zablocki opinion is perplexing because it unsystematically fuses
together equal protection, due process, and fundamental rights analyses.
Justice Marshall's argument is structured like a classic equal protection
opinion: (1) it locates a constitutionally protected interest in the statute
(in this case, the right to marry); (2) it uses this interest to establish a
level of scrutiny for the statute (in this case, because marriage is a
fundamental right, state classifications implicating marriage are subject
to "critical examination" by the courts); (3) it analyzes the state interests
advanced to justify the statute to determine if they are sufficiently
important and narrowly drawn (in this case, the Wisconsin statute's
classification of marriage does not survive the critical examination).
Marshall's conclusion sounds like an equal protection conclusion, "The
33. Id. at 386. He later distinguished Califano with the explanation that there the
"Social Security provisions placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to
get married, and.., there was no evidence that the laws significantly discouraged.., any
marriages." Id. at 387 n.12.
34. Id. at 387.
35. Id. at 388.
36. Id. at 388-89.
37. Id. at 390-91.
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statutory classification created by [the statute] thus cannot be justified
by the interests advanced in support of it."38
However, the classification made by the Wisconsin statute in
Zablocki is the line it draws between people who are allowed to marry
(the default) and people who are not allowed to marry (because they
owe child support). Standard equal protection review allows that any
remotely conceivable "rational basis" for a classification is sufficient to
sustain the classification, unless the classification utilizes or implicates
forbidden characteristics, like race. No such characteristics are involved
here, and the Court could not plausibly argue that men who are years
behind in their child support are a threatened class in need of special
judicial protection from legislative animosity. Ordinarily, the legislature
could single out men who are delinquent in child support as a class in
any number of different ways for unfavorable treatment intended to
persuade them to pay their child support.3 9 In short, Wisconsin's offered
justifications for the men-who-are-delinquent classification in its
marriage statute pass the rational basis test.
The Court's technique in Zablocki for ratcheting up its level of
scrutiny from "rational basis" to a "critical examination"-the step that
determines the outcome of the case-is to say that the Wisconsin
classification affects the plaintiffs' access to marriage, which is a
fundamental right) n° This is a substantive due process technique. Thus,
the substance of the right to marry, rather than the classification of men
who are delinquent, is the real issue in Zablocki, though the Court's use
of equal protection analysis and rhetoric obscures this fact. Zablocki's
real holding is a substantive due process holding that Wisconsin cannot
define the boundaries of marriage as a legal relationship available to
anyone who has not been irresponsible enough to fall behind in his or
her child support payments.
The Zablocki Court says it strikes down the statute on equal
protection grounds, but the holding's work is actually done by
substantive due process notions.4" Why? We will return to this puzzle

38. Id.
39. See id. at 389-90 (noting ways the state may enforce support obligations).
40. Id. at 386.
41. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). "The problem in this case is not one of discriminatory
classifications, but of unwarranted encroachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom."
Id. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Cass Sunstein, acknowledging the power
of Stewart's criticism but trying to circumvent it, argues, "Notwithstanding its clear
association of the right to marry with other rights protected by the Due Process Clause,
[Zablocki's] ultimate holding turned on the fundamental rights branch of the equal protection
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later; for present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Zablocki picked
up Loving's language about a fundamental right to marry and relied
solely upon the right to marry to strike down a state marriage
regulation-the first case to do so.
D. Exposition
Nine years later, Turner v. Safley held that the fundamental right to
marry prevented a Missouri prison from imposing an "almost complete
ban on the decision to marry" for inmates.4 2' The prison in Turner
enforced a regulation allowing inmates to marry only if the prison
superintendent granted them permission; permission was only granted
for "compelling reasons," which usually meant only in the case of a
pregnancy or an illegitimate child.43 When inmates seeking to marry
challenged the rule, the federal district and appellate courts applied
strict scrutiny to it on the ground that marriage was a fundamental
right." Both found the restriction impermissibly broad in light of the
state's asserted interests of promoting prisoner rehabilitation and prison
security.45
The Supreme Court affirmed, declaring, "The right to marry, like
many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of
incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however,
46
after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life.,
Citing marriage as conveying "emotional support and public
commitment," carrying "spiritual significance," promising the prospect
of "ultimate[] ... full[] consumma[tion]," and being a "precondition to
doctrine, not on substantive due process...." Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2005). Thus, "judgments about the scope of the right to marry
ought to be made with close attention to the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 2112.
Sunstein's attempt to bring clarity to Zablocki is unsatisfying. It is unclear what a
"fundamental right to marry" contributes to constitutional doctrine if the extent of that right
is determined by equal protection considerations. If equal protection concerns drive the
Court to a conclusion about regulation of marriage, why not simply rest the holding on equal
protection grounds without reference to any right to marry? Sunstein's proposal to hide
equal protection holdings in a substantive fundamental right analysis is an inversion of what
the Zablocki majority did (hiding a substantive fundamental right analysis in an equal
protection holding), and it risks creating a legal regime where future marriage regulations
which do not implicate equal protection concerns are struck down merely because the notion
of a fundamental right has been unnecessarily attached to legal marriage.
42. 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987).
43. Id. at 82.
44. Id. at 83.
45. Id. at 83-84.
46. Id. at 95.
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the receipt of government benefits," Justice O'Connor decided, "Taken
together, we conclude that these remaining elements are sufficient to
form a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison
context., 47 The Court then found the prison's marriage restrictions to
not even pass a "reasonable relationship" test in light of the reasons
given by the state for the regulations.48
Turner's discussion of the right to marry is quite brief, and the Court
makes little effort to explain what it envisions the larger ramifications of
its opinion should be. However, the implications of the decision are
potentially quite broad. The "attributes of marriage" the Court found
adequate to merit constitutional protection in Turner are small and, with
the exception of government benefits, include little that inmates could
not obtain by a declaration of commitment irrespective of any official,
legal marriage. If this shadow of marriage is sufficient to qualify as a
fundamental right, the fundamental right to marry might be robust,
indeed.49
On the other hand, such a thin account of marriage raises the
question of what minimum core of attributes is necessary to create a
constitutionally protected marriage interest, and why this particular
minimum core qualifies, rather than a different one. Turner does not
even attempt to answer this question; it cryptically declares "we
conclude these remaining elements are sufficient" and moves on."' This
approach disposes of the case at hand, but its lack of explanation smacks
of legislation rather than adjudication, and it provides little guidance for
the future, especially in light of the fact that the attributes the opinion
47. Id. at 95-96.
48. Id. at 97.
49. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Comment, Divorcing Marriagefrom Procreation,114 YALE
L.J. 1989, 1996 (2005) ("The Turner Court had to evaluate whether prisoners-prisoners!with no procreative justification still have a fundamental right to marry, and it held
unanimously that they do. The case demonstrates, therefore, that marriage is fundamental
under the U.S. Constitution not because it provides a setting for heterosexual procreation but
because it solemnizes a social relationship that individuals regard as fundamentally important.
Employing Turnerfor this proposition might have added the legitimacy of doctrinal argument
to [Goodridge v. Department of Public Health]'s revolutionary outcome [requiring
Massachusetts to grant same-sex couples marriage licenses]."); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in
the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1202 (2004) ("[I]t is important to note that Turner by necessity
delinks marriage from privacy. This is so because prisoners do not enjoy constitutionally
protected privacy rights.... Furthermore, the fundamental right to marry applied in Turner
even though there is no corresponding right of married individuals to engage in sexual
intimacy while in prison.").
50. Turner, 482 U.S. at 96.
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considers sufficient to qualify as a "constitutionally protected marital
relationship" are not convincing on that question." In view of the
opinion's declaration that the prison regulations in question did not
even have a "reasonable relationship" to the ends advanced by the state
to justify them, it might make more sense to read Turner very narrowly
because rules which fail a "reasonable relationship" test would be
stricken down for infringing on almost any interest, fundamental right or
not.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE DOCTRINE: CONTRADICTION
WITHIN THE RIGHT TO MARRY

Though the idea of a right to marry has intuitive appeal to anyone
familiar with the place of marriage in American tradition and society,
the fundamental right to marry jurisprudence remains murky. The
extent of the right to marry has not been detailed.52 In part, this is
because the constitutional marriage jurisprudence contains a significant
internal tension. As seen above, the Court calls marriage a fundamental
right. Yet the Court has also long said that states have almost total
power to regulate marriage: "The State... has absolute right to
prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
51. As noted above, the Turner Court mentions four aspects of marriage that can persist
even in a prison setting: "emotional support and public commitment," "spiritual significance,"
the prospect of full consummation in the future, and the receipt of government benefits. Why
marriage's expression of "emotional support and public commitment" makes it deserve
special constitutional protection is unclear. In Turner itself the Court upheld restrictions on
inmate letter-writing, which is certainly a means of expressing emotional support and
commitment. Turner,482 U.S. at 99. Perhaps the Court intends this argument to be placed in
the historical favoritism shown to marriage, but it does not say so and such an argument
would be vulnerable to the counterpoint that marriage has historically been closely regulated
and restricted by the state, any emotional support and public commitment function
notwithstanding. See infra Part V.A. Arguments that religious beliefs about marriage
rendered state limitations on it invalid were decisively rejected by the Court in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). This, along with the Court's affirmation that laws of general
applicability are not rendered invalid by particular religious beliefs in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), suggests that "spiritual significance" cannot justify a fundamental
right to marry. The prospect of full consummation of marriage is irrelevant to prison
marriages because the intended spouses could always marry later, when the "prospect"
became real. This leaves only the receipt of government benefits, and it is clear that there is
no fundamental right to receive such benefits. See infra Part IV.A.6.
52. "There is little consensus on the parameters and boundaries of the right to marry.
The courts have yet to decide what exactly is meant by the right to marry ....They have yet
to decide on the fundamental purpose of marriage." John Hiski Ridge, A Philosophical
Analysis of the Fundamental Law of Marriage in American Jurisprudence 19 (Dec. 2004)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College) (on file with author).
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dissolved;"53 "Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life,
as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than
any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the
legislature.... [R]ights under 54it are determined by the will of the
sovereign, as evidenced by law.,
A. Logical Tension

Quite simply, broad state power to regulate marriage clashes with
the idea of marriage as fundamental right. If a state can define the
boundaries of marriage, then it can manage its citizens' access to
marriage through those boundaries. But, if marriage is a fundamental
constitutional right, such state attempts to restrict access to it should be
viewed with great suspicion by the courts.
This tension has been noted by historians55 and by commentators
attempting to analyze the fundamental right to marry. John Hiski Ridge
notes "the apparent conflict of two seemingly incompatible lines of cases
that have developed in the common law."56

He describes competing

claims about the nature of marriage, each based upon Supreme Court
cases: one line with the view "that government should exercise broad
control over marriage to support and protect ...traditional purposes

and perceptions," and another line with the view "[e]ach individual
citizen should have the right to define marriage for herself... [and]
government involvement in marriage should be limited. 5 7 William
Hohengarten writes, "There is an obvious tension between the states'
power to define marriage and their obligation not to interfere with
decisions to enter into a marital relationship."58 Jamal Greene muses,
"[i]t has become popular to state without elaboration that legislatures,
not judges, define marriage. But if this is so, then marriage is an odd
fundamental right. The jurisprudential purpose of calling a right

53. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877).
54. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888).
55. "Marriage remained simply too important to be left entirely to the invisible hand of
the nuptial marketplace. Rather, a recurrent tension between public and private nuptial
responsibilities persisted. Lawyers and laypersons, haunted by a fear of marriage lapsing
either into individual anarchy or state coercion, repeatedly struggled to balance the two."
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 21 (1985).
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56. Ridge, supra note 52, at 11.
57. Id. at 11-12.
58. William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103
YALE L.J. 1495, 1505 (1994).
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'fundamental' is to remove it from the vagaries of the ordinary political
process."'5 9
Some have argued that the right to marry is itself nonsensical. Earl
Maltz sees "unusually complex theoretical problems" behind a
fundamental right to marry, including federalism issues, defining what
the right to marry means, and the problem of a fundamental right
requiring the exertion of state power behind a consensual arrangement
rather than merely granting freedom from constraint. 60 Arguing that the
traditional purposes of marriage-public expression of support and
commitment, economic partnership, and sexual activity-can be fulfilled
for any individual without them entering into a legally recognized
marriage, he concludes, "Fundamental right/compelling governmental
interest analysis is ill-suited to the task of dealing with the complex
variety of rights and obligations implicated by the right to marry."61
Others have simply taken the Court's pronouncements of a
fundamental right to marry at face value as limitations on state power
over marriage.
[C]ivil marriage... cannot exist in the absence of state
recognition. It is State action that creates the very
institution that makes the exercise of the fundamental
right to liberty in the context of marriage possible. There
are constitutional limitations, therefore, in the ability of
the state to refuse to recognize (heterosexual) marriage.62
Cass Sunstein attempts to balance the tension between state
regulation and a fundamental right to marry by comparing marriage to
voting: "[L]ike the right to vote, the right to marry is a right of equal
access to a publicly-administered institution ....[T]he right to marry is
parasitic on positive law. It is a right of access ...to the expressive and
material benefits that official marriage provides., 63 Sunstein's approach
would classify the right to marry not under substantive due process, but
''as part of the 'fundamental rights' branch of equal protection
59. Greene, supra note 49, at 1992-93 (internal citations omitted).
60. Earl M. Maltz, ConstitutionalProtectionfor the Right to Marry: A Dissenting View,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 954-55 (1992).
61. Id. at 956-67.
62. Ball, supra note 49, at 1206. See also, Hohengarten, supra note 58, at 1496 ("[T]he
right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal
framework.").
63. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2118.
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doctrine." 64 However, he admits "there is no simple explanation of why
it should so qualify," advancing "the expressive benefits of marriage" as
the "most plausible account. 65
This escape, though, has two flaws. First, marriage is different from
voting because voting is a
an individual's right to vote is
meaningless outside the context of other people's voting rights. In
contrast, a marriage can exist on its own.66 Second, Sunstein's approach
renders any "fundamental right" aspect of marriage essentially
irrelevant. Under Sunstein's approach, the hard questions about the
permissible range of state limitations on marriage would be answered by
equal protection considerations. Comments about the "fundamental"
nature of the marriage would be little more than rhetorical place-fillers
in judicial opinions.
Sunstein's approach resolves the state
regulation/fundamental right tension by largely eviscerating the
significance of the fundamental right, at least as it applies to staterecognized marriage.67

A second, closer look at the Supreme Court's marriage rhetoric
reveals that the tension between fundamental right and state regulation
has been present in the Court's language about marriage from the
beginning, though it lurked unrecognized.
declared:
Statutes in many of the States, it is true, regulate the
mode of entering into the [marriage] contract, but they
do not confer the right .... No doubt, a statute may
declare that no marriages shall be valid unless they are
solemnized in a prescribed manner; but such an
enactment is a very different thing from a law requiring
all marriages to be entered into in the presence of a
magistrate or a clergyman, or that it be preceded by a
license, or publication of banns, or be attested by
witnesses. Such formal provisions may be construed as
merely directory, instead of being treated as destructive

64.
at 2097.
65.
at 2118.
66.
at 2097.
67. Sunstein does reserve meaning for the fundamental right to marry by concluding it
includes "some right of intimate association in the private sphere" that the state may not
prohibit.
at 2096;
Parts V and VI.
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of a common-law right to form the marriage relation by
words of present assent.6
In this short space, the Court equivocated between broad legislative
power to regulate the entering of marriage, the right to marry which it
considered prior to legislation, the legitimate power of the state to
require procedural formalities for marriage, and the common-law right
to marry by simple words of assent. Similarly, in Maynard the Court
said that because marriage is the "most important relation in life" (an
argument that would today be used to justify a claim of some right as a
fundamental right or a substantive due process right outside the control
of the legislature6 9) this is why it "has always been subject to the control
of the legislature."'70
Tension between the right/freedom to marry and state regulation of
marriage bubbled to the surface in Boddie v. Connecticut. There the
majority declared:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in
this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant
state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving
this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from
denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its
court to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages."
This statement is interesting because it gestures back to the early
nineteenth-century understanding that the social significance of
marriage justifies state regulation of marriage while simultaneously
invoking the modern understanding that individual rights justify
limitations on the state's regulatory power. Thus, Boddie attempted to
straddle old understandings of marriage and new views on individual
liberty. But in response, Justice Black's Boddie dissent argued:

68. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78-79 (1877).
69. E.g., MARK STRASSER, ON SAME SEX MARRIAGE,

CIVIL UNIONS, AND THE RULE
OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AT THE CROSSROADS, 118 (2002) ("The

reason that marital prohibitions must be examined closely is that marriage involves such an
important right, which serves a variety of societal and individual purposes. Marriage provides
a setting in which children might be produced and raised and, given the lesbian and gay baby
boom, this is an important reason to recognize same-sex unions.").
70. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
71. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
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This is a strange case and a strange holding. Absent
some specific federal constitutional or statutory
provision, marriage in this country is completely under
state control, and so is divorce.... The Court here
holds, however, that the State of Connecticut has so little
control over marriages and divorces of its own citizens
that it is without power to charge them practically
nominal initial court costs ....

Justice Black thus took the position that state power over marriage is
near plenary and threw down the gauntlet to the majority to say
otherwise.
The Boddie majority had only a weak response to his challenge. It
acknowledged state power over "many aspects" of marriage but tried to
avoid addressing the details of the extent of such power, framing the
case (and most of its analysis) instead in terms of a due process right of
access to the courts. 3

However, these access-to-court considerations

were rendered peripheral when the end of the opinion qualified its
holding as only reaching "this legal relationship" of marriage, which is
"a fundamental human relationship."7 4 Thus, Boddie gave decisive
weight to the fundamental status of marriage but did so gingerly, hiding
behind notions of court access to avoid giving any substantive
explication of the "fundamental human relationship" of marriage.
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of the Court's
fundamental right/state regulation of marriage tension appeared in
Zablocki itself:

By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to
marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state
regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or
prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous
scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do
not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.75
After this glib assertion, Zablocki failed to provide any rubric for
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 389-90 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 376-77 (majority opinion).
Id. at 383.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
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determining what regulations are "reasonable" and "do not significantly
interfere" with decisions to marry. It did not address longstanding state
bans on polygamy, which certainly interfere with decisions to enter into
marital relationships, nor did it give any account of what minimum set of
relationships the boundaries of marriage must constitutionally include.
Unresolved tension between state power to regulate marriage and
the idea of a fundamental right to marry explains the above-noted
puzzle in the Zablocki opinion-the use of equal protection analysis to
strike down the statute when substantive due process considerations do
most of the analytic work. The Zablocki Court was unwilling-perhaps
unable-to lay down an explanation of the boundaries of the
fundamental right to marry, but it wanted to use the notion of a
fundamental right to marry to strike down the statute. So it used the
substantive due process right to trigger an equal protection analysis. By
cloaking its holding in equal protection language, it hid the fundamental
right to marry doctrine's need of an account of its borders.
This stratagem, though, did not go unnoticed. Zablocki generated
three separate opinions concurring in judgment, and a dissent. The
multiplicity of opinions is explained by the Justices' disagreement over
how to deal with the problem of finding a principled way to define the
boundaries of a fundamental right to marry.
Justice Stewart's concurrence in the judgment pointed out the
misdirection in the majority opinion, declaring, "The Equal Protection
Clause deals not with substantive rights or freedoms but with invidiously
,,16
and accusing the majority of using
discriminatory classifications,
"substantive due process by another name" to avoid the criticisms
associated with the doctrine.77 He advocated "bring[ing] ...into the
open" the substantive due process holding to "force[ ] a healthy and
responsible recognition of the nature and purpose of the extreme power
we wield when... we invalidate pro tanto the process of representative
democracy." 78
Though he used substantive due process to reach the same
conclusion as the majority on the facts of Zablocki, Stewart's opinion
rejected the Court's premise:
I do not agree with the Court that there is a "right to
marry" in the constitutional sense. That right, or more
76. Id. at 391 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
77. Id. at 395.
78. Id. at 396.
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accurately that privilege, is under our- federal system
peculiarly one to be defined and limited by state law. A
State may not only "significantly interfere with decisions
to enter into marital relationship,"79 but may in many
circumstances absolutely prohibit it.
He found instead a liberty interest in the decision to marry, and argued
that Wisconsin's regulation impermissibly infringed this liberty by
preventing the poor from marrying. 8°
Like the majority, though, Stewart did not himself provide a
principled way of defining the boundaries of the constitutionally
protected liberty to marry or a solution to the tension between state
power over marriage and the liberty to marry. He simply phrased his
ducking of the question differently: "But, just as surely, in regulating the
intimate human relationship of marriage,
there is a limit beyond which a
'
go."'
constitutionally
not
may
State
Justice Powell's concurrence in judgment in Zablocki opened by
criticizing the majority's failure to provide an account of the boundaries
of the fundamental right to marry: "the majority's rationale sweeps too
broadly in an area which traditionally has been subject to pervasive state
regulation ....The Court does not present.. . any principled means for
distinguishing between" marriage regulations which impermissibly
interfere with the decision to marry and regulations which are
reasonable and legitimate.82 Aside from that clear observation and a
slightly longer exposition of the states' traditional power to regulate
domestic relations, Powell's conclusions differed little in substance from
Stewart's-and he too failed to provide a "principled means" for
distinguishing between legitimate marriage regulations and illegitimate
ones.
Of those agreeing with the judgment in Zablocki, Justice Stevens
came closest to a pure equal protection holding. His concurrence in
judgment acknowledged state marital regulatory power:
The individual's interest in making the marriage decision
independently is sufficiently important to merit special
constitutional protection. It is not, however, an interest

79.
80.
81.
82.

id. at 392 (footnotes and internal citation omitted).
Id. at 394-96.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).

2006]

QUESTIONING THE RIGHT TO MARRY

which is constitutionally immune from evenhanded
regulation. Thus, laws prohibiting marriage to a child, a
close relative, or a person afflicted with venereal disease,
are unchallenged even though they "interfere
directly
83
and substantially with the right to marry.,
Stevens focused his analysis primarily on the way in which the
Wisconsin statute discriminated between rich and poor, and he would
have invalidated the statute as irrational discrimination simply on those
grounds." However, his reference to "special constitutional protection"
for the individual interest "in making the marriage decision
independently" let the marriage boundary problem in the back door of
the opinion, and to this question he offered only the unenlightening
standard of requiring state regulation of the decision to marry to be
"evenhanded."85
Justice Rehnquist was the only dissenter in Zablocki. He rejected
the idea that a fundamental right to marry required strict scrutiny of the
statute, finding it only subject to rational basis review for both equal
protection and due process challenges." His approach was largely based
on an interpretation of Califano v. Jobst that required a rational basis
standard for
all marriage regulations.87 In his view, the statute passed
88
test.
a
such
One can see in the Zablocki opinions the Justices struggling to
extricate themselves from the horns of a dilemma. With the exception
of Rehnquist (and possibly Stevens), they all see marriage as an
arrangement meriting at least some substantive constitutional protection
from the intruding eyes and hands of the state. Yet none can specify
where the constitutional boundaries of marriage lie, or where a
principled account of such boundaries can be found. They are forced to
resort to formulations of "reasonable" or "evenhanded" regulations, or
to invoke vague concepts of "a limit" or "family life." They are
adjudicating on raw instinct.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 406.
See id. at 404.
Id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 407.
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C. Legal Tension

Prompted by the realization that the Court's marriage rhetoric
contains contradictory themes of broad state power and fundamental
rights, one can find in the U.S. Reports marriage cases whose holdings
implicitly treat marriage as not being a fundamental right, and which
therefore do not use the language of fundamental rights.
In Cannon v. United States, the Court upheld the criminalization of
polygamy, saying it was "not a lawful substitute for the monogamous
family which alone the statute tolerates., 89 It would be odd if a
fundamental right to marry could be overridden by a mere statute
limiting marriages to one at a time; no law restricting authors writing
more than one book at a time or limiting a property owner's search and
seizure protections to one home at a time would be considered as
complying with First Amendment or Fourth Amendment protections.
But Cannon implicitly holds that the constitutional boundaries of
protection for marriage do not require allowing a person to have more
than one marriage at a time.
In Williams v. North Carolina, the Court upheld North Carolina's

refusal to recognize two divorces accomplished in Nevada.'
O.B.
Williams and Lillie Hendrix, each married to another person, had
traveled from North Carolina to Nevada, divorced their respective
spouses under Nevada law, and married each other. 9' When they
returned to North Carolina, they were prosecuted for bigamous
cohabitation, the North Carolina courts having decided the Nevada
divorces were invalid under North Carolina law since Williams and
Hendrix had not established domicile in Nevada at the time of their
divorce decrees. 92
The United States Supreme Court held that the North Carolina
courts acted lawfully in refusing to recognize the Nevada divorces. 9

The Supreme Court's analysis focused on federalism issues and gave no
consideration to any question of marriage as a fundamental right.
Justice Rutledge pointed out that the result of the decision was two

89. 116 U.S. 55, 72 (1885). Later, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), the Court again upheld the laws banning polygamous
marriage, despite arguments that such laws forbade Mormons from practicing their deeply
held religious beliefs.
90. 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945).
91. Id. at 234-35.
92. Id. at 227.
93. Id. at 239.
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divorces that were valid in Nevada but not in North Carolina (so
change when they crossed
Williams and Shaver had their marital status
94
state lines), but his view was the dissent.
A truly robust notion of marriage as a fundamental right would
allow individuals to choose to enter and exit marriages as they wished,
making divorce largely a question of intent and making a person's
marital status the same wherever he or she traveled. However, the
Williams Court did not even consider such a possibility, instead allowing
a couple to be punished for bigamy when both spouses had bona fide
beliefs that their previous marriages had been terminated by the Nevada
court system.
In Lutwak v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld several
convictions for conspiracy to defraud, rejecting the defendants'
argument that their marriages rendered their conduct legal. 95 Marcel
Lutwak and his aunt Regina Treitler lived in the United States and
sought to get Treitler's brothers, Polish refugees living in Paris, into the
United States.96 They arranged for World War II veterans to marry the
brothers so they could enter the United States as alien spouses under
the War Brides Act, with the understanding that the new couples would
When the scheme was
divorce after arriving back in America.'
discovered, Lutwak and Treitler were prosecuted for conspiracy to
defraud the United States by circumventing the immigration laws.98 It
was stipulated that the marriages in question had been formally and
legally contracted in Paris, and the defendants argued that because the
marriages were legitimate, it could not be fraudulent for them to tell
immigration officials they were married.99
The Court dismissed the defendants' legally binding marriages as
irrelevant. "We do not believe that the validity of the marriages is
material.... We consider the marriage ceremonies only as a part of the
It further declared,
conspiracy to defraud the United States .... ."'
"The common understanding of a marriage, which Congress must have
had in mind when it made provisions for 'alien spouses' in the War
Brides Act, is that the two parties have undertaken to establish a life

94. Id. at 244 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

95. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
96. Id. at 605-06.
97. Id. at 606-07.
98. Id. at 605.
99. Id. at 610-11.
100. Id. at 611.
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together and assume certain duties and obligations." 0 ' Justice Jackson
argued in dissent:
These marriages were [legally] contracted in France, and
there is no contention that they were forbidden or illegal
there for any reason.... If the parties are validly
married, even though the marriage is a sordid one, we
should suppose that would end the case.... Marriages of
convenience are not uncommon and it cannot be that we
would hold it a fraud for one who has contracted a
marriage not forbidden by law to represent himself as
wedded ....

102

The Lutwak Court decided that a marriage, assumed to be valid,
may be treated as nonexistent merely because the subjective purpose of
the spouses in marrying was not the purpose the Court thought the
immigration statute "must have" required for a marriage." 3 But if
marriage is a fundamental right, immigration laws should not be able to
impose subjective intent conditions upon it. Further, one would expect
a fundamental right to marry to include the requirement that a validly
contracted marriage be treated on equal terms as other valid marriages.
In Wyatt v. United States, the Court held that a woman could be
forced to testify against her will against her husband despite the marital
privilege against such testimony.1°4 The context was a prosecution under
the Mann Act for the interstate transportation of a woman for the
purpose of prostitution; upon arrest, the defendant married the woman
he was accused of transporting. 5 At trial, both spouses claimed that
spousal privilege prevented the wife from testifying against him.'0 The
Supreme Court found that the purpose of the Mann Act-"to protect
women who were weak from men who were bad"-would not be served
by allowing the wife to avoid testimony in such a case. °7 This decision,
then, put the legislative scheme of the Mann Act above the trial rights
which were seen as an important part of the marriage relationship.
Ariela Dubler characterizes the import of Wyatt as being that the law
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 620-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 611.
362 U.S. 525 (1960).
Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 530 (quoting Denning v. United States, 247 F. 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1918)).
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(here, the Mann Act specifically) protected marriage as an institution
before it protected the rights and well-being of individuals: "Marriage,
not individual women, needed to be protected from the amorphous
threat of illicit sexual practices.""
In 1975, Sosna v. Iowa held that Iowa could constitutionally limit the
divorces granted by its courts to applicants with at least a full year of
Carol Sosna had challenged the residency
residence in Iowa."°9
requirement as a violation of her constitutional rights to travel and as an
unconstitutional restriction on her only means of ending her marriage,
citing Boddie."" However, the Supreme Court upheld the statute,
finding that Iowa's law only delayed access to divorce, rather than
and that Iowa had a legitimate interest to justify the waiting
denying it,
period (protecting its divorce decrees from collateral attack in other
states)." 1 The effect of this decision was to prevent Sosna from
remarrying until the residency requirement was fulfilled; it is difficult to
imagine the Court having such a cavalier attitude toward state-imposed
delay in exercising constitutional rights in contexts other than the right
to marry.
In 1977, Califano v. Jobst declared valid a law diminishing
government benefits to someone upon marriage despite the fact "some
persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or
because some who did marry were burdened thereby.""' As with Sosna,
it is difficult to imagine such a result for a hypothetical law attaching a
penalty to the exercise of other recognized constitutional rights, like free
speech or the use of contraceptives.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE REASONING: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
THE RIGHT TO MARRY

The marriage boundary disputes in the cases above illustrate how a
state's definition and treatment of marriage can affect the access of its
citizens to the benefits of marriage. Maynard listed many such marriage
boundary issues, citing "the age at which parties may contract to marry,
108. Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115
YALE L.J. 756, 806 (2006).
109. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
110. Id. at 405.
111. Id. at 410.
112. 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977). Though it recognized this deterrent effect or burden on the
decision to marry, the Califano majority also found significance in the fact that the regulation
in question was not "an attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision
as important as marriage." Id.
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the procedure or form essential to constitute a marriage, the duties and
obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights.., and the acts
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.... To these might be
added who is allowed to marry whom; the permissible reasons for
marrying; the conditions and procedures necessary to dissolve a
marriage; and the privileges bestowed by marriage.
For a fundamental right to marry to have useful meaning, it must
provide a way of approaching and deciding marriage boundary disputes.
What is the substantive core of the fundamental right to marry upon
Do constitutional
which marriage legislation may not trespass?
protections fix a maximum or minimum age of consent for marriage?
Do they require a person be allowed to marry anyone he or she chooses,
or do they allow states to restrict the field of spousal choice with general
rules (like incest rules or opposite-sex requirements)? Do they specify
that certain procedures must be sufficient to create a legal marriage?
Does the fundamental right mandate sex roles within a marriage?
Forbid them? Is a state's limitation of marriages to one-at-a-time-perCan federal
person acceptable under the fundamental right?
immigration law give special treatment to some marriages but not
others?
In the face of all these questions about the boundaries of
constitutionally protected marriage, Zablocki magisterially pronounces
marriage a fundamental right and commands that only "reasonable"
state regulation of marriage is permissible. But the critical questionthe details of the constitutionally protected core of marriage, which
"reasonable" regulations must leave intact-goes unaddressed and
unanswered.
To that question we now turn. There exist three obvious, potentially
fruitful, approaches to defining the constitutional core of the
fundamental right to marry: (1) purpose (the reason why "marriage" is a
fundamental right might indicate what "marriage" is); (2) deduction (the
characteristic features of "fundamental rights" might indicate what
attributes "marriage" possesses, on the assumption that marriage is a
fundamental right); (3) essence (the jurisprudential concept of a
"marriage" might have unchanging inherent meaning, like the geometric
concept of a "square").

113. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
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A. PurposiveApproach: Reasoningfrom Why MarriageIs a
FundamentalRight
One might expect the explanation of why marriage is a fundamental
right to offer an account of the boundaries of the right to marry.
Unfortunately, the marriage cases do not give a complete or satisfactory
account of why marriage should be a fundamental right. They are long
on platitudes about how marriage "involves interests of basic
importance in our society,"'' 14 but this observation by itself does little to
separate marriage from labor regulations, education requirements,
environmental laws, or transportation rules.
1. Tradition
Perhaps the most common reason given for recognizing a
fundamental right to marry is simple tradition. Loving refers to the
right to marry as having "long been recognized";" 5 Meyer to the right as
"long recognized at common law";116 and Zablocki to "our past decisions
[which] make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental
importance."..7 Stare decisis is a powerful argument, and the Court has
considered history and tradition important in evaluating claims of
fundamental rights,'18 but one would hope that at the beginning of the
trail some practical or theoretical justification for the right would exist.
A right defined by tradition alone gives little guidance as to its
constitutional boundaries, especially if social practice surrounding that
right is highly dynamic. Further, since traditional (to some) conceptions
of marriage were rejected by the Court as unconstitutional in Loving,
strict adherence to tradition cannot be the whole story regarding the
right to marry. The Court's acceptance of some traditional aspects of
114. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
115. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
116. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
117. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
118. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) ("Our established
method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly
observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"
(quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion));
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion) ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572
(2003) ("[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of
the substantive due process inquiry." (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[90:21

marriage as fundamental in conjunction with its rejection of other
traditional aspects suggests that tradition is not determinative of the
boundaries of the right to marry.
2. Personal Freedom
A second constellation of justifications given by the Court for the
right to marry involves personal freedom considerations.

Meyer

asserted that marriage was "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
120
by free men,"

9

and Loving and Zablocki echoed this thought.

However, this is objectively wrong, at least as applied to state licensing
of marriage. Free men doubtless felt free to pursue happiness before
governments began licensing marriage. The pursuit of happiness cannot
support a fundamental right to government licensing of one's marriage
any more than it can support a fundamental right to a governmentprovided Corvette, no matter how much some people may feel a
Corvette is necessary for their personal happiness.
Another formulation of the happiness argument rephrases the right
to marry in terms of its importance to people's lifestyle choices.
Zablocki declared, "the right to marry is of fundamental importance for

all individuals.. . and marriage [is characterized] as 'the most important
relation in life."' 12'

Boddie
emphasized marriage as a "fundamental
22

human relationship." 1
Such assertions about marriage are true for many, but others reject
them. 123 Unless the Court can explain why the Constitution enshrines
119. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
120. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
121. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205) (1888).
122. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
123. "Like prostitution, marriage is an institution that is extremely oppressive and
dangerous for women." ANDREA DWORKIN, Feminism: An Agenda, in LETTERS FROM A
WAR ZONE 133, 146 (1989). Others argue that marriage oppresses those who are not part of
it: "Marriage sanctifies some couples at the expense of others. It is selective legitimacy. This
is a necessary implication of the institution, and not just the result of bad motives .... The
ennobling and demeaning go together. Marriage does one only by virtue of the other."
MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF
QUEER LIFE 82 (1999).
See also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230
(1995) ("[Marriage] will continue to occupy a privileged status and be posited as the ideal,
defining other intimate entities as deviant. Instead of seeking to eliminate the stigma by

analogizing more and more relationships to marriage, why not just abolish the category as a
legal status and, in that way, render all sexual relationships equal with each other and all
relationships equal with the sexual?"); Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 505-06 (1994) (calling the fundamental right to marry either "a
complete constitutional anomaly" or "an expression of structural heterosexism").
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marriage as the most important relation in life for all individuals, views
about the "fundamental importance" of marriage remain mere personal
preferences. The importance of something to an individual does not
justify considering it a fundamental right, even if that preference enjoys
widespread popular affirmance. Individuals who prize education may
consider it fundamentally important that they earn a Ph.D., but there is
no fundamental right to a doctorate.
A third formulation of the personal-freedom argument for a
fundamental right to marry invokes marriage as an expressive resource,
a way of publicly communicating commitment to another person.
Clearly, this is a purpose which marriage can serve. To claim it justifies
marriage as a fundamental right, though, is strange. The government is
not constitutionally required to provide a forum for expression of
ordinary messages; why should an expression of commitment to another
person be any different?"'

3. Social Practice
A stronger formulation of the personal-significance argument for a
fundamental right to marry changes the focus from the personal
significance of marriage to the social significance of marriage. The
Court has made this argument in three different ways.
First, in Boddie the Court declared:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in
this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant
state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving
this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from
denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its
courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages. 125

The Court thus argues that marriage has some status in the social
hierarchy of values that justifies judicial abrogation of legislation
impinging upon marriage. This claim does not withstand scrutiny, for
the foundational principle of democratic government is that the elected
legislature reflects society's hierarchy of values through its official acts.
Legislative restrictions upon marriage thus constitute the social
hierarchy of values regarding marriage, making it nonsensical for a court
124. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2094.
125. 401 U.S. at 374.
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to strike down marriage legislation purely on the ground that it violates
social values. 126 The hierarchy-of-values argument can only justify a
social-consensus derived fundamental right if it claims the courts have a
better understanding of popular beliefs than does the legislature, a
dubious proposition.

The second social-practice argument the Court has given for a right
to marry emphasizes marriage's role as the foundation of the family
unit.

It calls marriage the "foundation of the family and of society,

without which there would be neither civilization nor progress"1

27

and

says "it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with

respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the
decision to enter
the relationship that is the foundation of the family in
12
1
society.'
our
This claim falls prey to the same difficulties that plagued the
marriage-as-personally-important-to-people claim: the Court's rejection
of government-imposed lifestyles and its protection of individual
freedom in personal relationships make it clear that the state cannot29
require marriage to be the basis of individual living arrangements.

The government can no longer treat marriage as the sole legitimate
organization of private life.130 The optionality of marriage coupled with
126. The hierarchy-of-values argument claims that marriage is a fundamental right
because there is a social understanding that marriage is of fundamental importance. Once it
establishes the existence of the right through social consensus, the argument proceeds to fill in
the substantive content of that right against social consensus (as embodied in democraticallyenacted law) by allowing courts to strike down regulations they deem violative of the right.
The second step rejects the reasoning of the first.
127. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888); Zablocki v. Redhail. 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978) (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211).
128. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
129. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("Our
precedents 'have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.'
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." (internal
citation omitted)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) ("The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law,
is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a
general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of
the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the
law protects.").
130. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977) (declaring constitutionally protected
privacy interest in the "'right of an individual to be free in action, thought, experience, and
belief from government compulsion"') (quoting Philip B. Kurland, The Private 1, U. CHI.
MAG. 7, 8 (Autumn 1976)).
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the law's blurring of marriage through the extension of many of
marriage's legal characteristics to nonmarital relationships'3 1 and the
real decline of marriage as the "foundation of the family"' 3 2 render the
foundation-of-the-family argument unable to justify a fundamental right
to marry.
A third social-practice argument for a fundamental right to marry
invokes vague "associational interests."' 33 In United States v. Kras, the
Court found no fundamental right to court access in a bankruptcy case,
despite the right of court access to obtain a divorce established in
Boddie. 134 It distinguished the two types of proceedings on the basis of
the "associational interests that surround the establishment and
dissolution of [marriage]."' 3 5 The extent and significance of these
''associational interests" is unclear; the Court has not subsequently
expounded upon the phrase. Kras itself cited only Loving, Skinner,
Griswold, Eisenstadt,and Meyer to support the "associational interests,"
so the phrase seems to be merely a restatement of the argument that
marriage has historically been important, rather than a reference to the
separate right of free association.136
131. See, e.g., Janet Radcliffe Richards, Metaphysics for the Marriage Debate, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2005) ("The legal and social differentiation of treatment between
the married and unmarried has changed beyond the recognition of a couple of generations
ago. Sex before marriage is normal, childbearing by single women and unmarried couples is
no longer much condemned, men can be held responsible for the support of their children
irrespective of whether they are married, and married couples can deal with their tax and
incomes separately."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (stating that unmarried
couples have the same reproductive privacy rights as married couples).
132. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000) (plurality opinion)
("The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household.
While many children may have two married parents and grandparents who visit regularly,
many other children are raised in single-parent households. In 1996, children living with only
one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children under age 18 in the United States." (citing
BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 1997

POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (1998))).

133. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973).
134. Id. at 450.
135. Id. at 444.
136. In 1984, the Court recognized a constitutional "freedom of association" in Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), though it upheld a state nondiscrimination statute in that
case against constitutional challenge that it infringed club members' freedom of association.
Roberts cited Loving and many of the family privacy cases in discussing the freedom of
intimate association. Id. at 618-20. However, extrapolating from freedom of association to a
right to have the government license a marriage is unjustified in light of the Court's holdings
in other cases that the government has no obligation to subsidize the exercise of even a
fundamental right. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549
(1983) ("We have held in several contexts [including the First Amendment] that a
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4. Political Health
Occasionally, the Court has argued that marriage is necessary for the
continued existence of a free state. In language reminiscent of the
Second Amendment, it has claimed:
[N]o legislation can be supposed more wholesome and
necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing
commonwealth ... than that which seeks to establish it
on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and
springing from the union for life of one man and one
woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure
foundation of all that is stable and noble in our
civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality
which is the source of all 31beneficent
progress in social
7
and political improvement.
To similar effect are Loving's and Meyer's assertions of the importance
of marriage to "free men. ' 38
Aside from its reliance on beliefs about political significance of
marriage that are now contested, 139 this argument is more in the nature
of a policy argument for marriage legislation than useful evidence of a
legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
right.
); Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988) (rejecting claim that cutting off food
stamps from striking employees violated their freedom of association because it pressured
them to quit their union). "[W]hen the Government appropriates public funds to establish a
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194
(1991) (upholding law that prohibited use of federal funds to pay for abortion counseling,
despite constitutional rights of freedom of speech and to have an abortion).
137. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
138. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). Bruce Hafen argues, "Marriage alone plays a critical role in the democratic structure
by interposing a significant legal entity between the individual and the State." Bruce C.
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the
Individualand Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 483 (1983). This view, at least as a legal
matter, has been rejected by the Supreme Court: "[T]he marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
139. See Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor
of Nuclear Families in American ConstitutionalLaw and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REV. 527,
530-31 (2001) ("[E]mphasis on relationships associated with traditional nuclear family
arrangements is anomalous. As individuals in record numbers reformulate the social
arrangements in which they choose to live, and social acceptance of alternative families
increases, the divide between family privacy jurisprudence and the majority of families
grows.... [I]t is critical to consider the extent of the deprivation of privacy protection to
nontraditional families .... (internal citations omitted)).
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fundamental right to marry. Citizens may have varying beliefs about
what social arrangements strengthen and promote liberty, but beliefs
cannot translate those social arrangements into fundamental rights.
And just because something has a salutary effect on political freedom
does not make it into a fundamental right. 4 °
5.

Privacy

The first four categories of justifications for a right to marry had
their origins in the nineteenth century. The Court's more recent cases
deploy subsequent developments in constitutional law to justify the right
to marry. Most notably, the Court refers to marriage as a manifestation
of privacy rights.'4
Zablocki interpreted Griswold as saying that marriage is a right
derivative of the right to privacy,'42 despite the lack of language in
Griswold explicitly gathering the right to enter marriage under the
mantle of privacy. On the facts of Griswold-intimateconduct typically
associated with marriage-privacy considerations seemed a natural
reason to strike down the legislation in question. However, that case
had nothing to say about entry into marriage or the boundaries of
marriage. Applying Griswold's use of privacy to an entirely different
context, as Zablocki did, is a doubtful proposition. The marriage at
issue in Zablocki was anything but private-the plaintiff there was
demanding public licensing of a marriage for himself.
Nothing
prevented him from privately conducting a religious marriage ceremony.
A claim of a privacy right to public marriage is contradictory on its

face. 143
An alternate formulation of the right to marry as a privacy right
claims that the right to marry derives from the fundamental right to
procreate. " Several of the Supreme Court marriage cases asserted that
140. Consider the "rights" of universal access to books and universal access to means of
publishing one's political views.
141. E.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
142. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
143. "This connection [of marriage rights and the right to privacy] is problematic,
however, because the right to marry is an associational right traditionally governed by the
body-politic, while the right to privacy is an individual right with which the body-politic
traditionally cannot interfere." Ridge, supra note 52, at 85. One might argue that privacy
rights include the right to enter into the only relationship where privacy is respected, but this
is foreclosed by the Court's extension of privacy rights to unmarried couples. See, e.g.,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
144. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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marriage was "fundamental" to the "very existence and survival" of
humanity.'45 By itself, this is patently untrue; humans have procreated
outside of marriage since long before Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter. 146
There is one way in which privacy rights might justify a right to
marry. If the state criminalizes private activity (nonmarital sexual
activity), then one might conclude that privacy and procreative rights
attach to the legal gateway that legitimizes that private procreative
conduct-marriage. The Zablocki Court's reinterpretation of Griswold
was likely prompted by this consideration: "[I]f appellee's right to
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the
only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations
legally to take place."147 The difference between this conclusion (which
the Zablocki opinion justifies) and a fundamental right to marry (which
Zablocki cements as constitutional doctrine) is that the first formulation
does not justify marriage as an independent fundamental right, but
rather as a right parasitic upon the initial criminalization of the intimate
behavior. Should the initial criminalization be removed, the right to
marry would also disappear.' 8
6. Economics
In Turner, Justice O'Connor noted that marriage is often the only
way of accessing certain government benefits.'49 This observation,
however, cannot justify a fundamental right to marry unless those
benefits themselves are already fundamental rights. "In general, denial
of access to economic benefits does not have any particular
constitutional significance. Rather, such denials normally are subject
only to the deferential, rational basis test."'50 The simple fact that
marriage is used as a mechanism to distribute benefits does not turn it
into a fundamental right any more than the fact that fishing licenses are
used to distribute benefits makes a fishing license a fundamental right.

145. Id. at 541; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
146. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Penguin Classics 2002) (1850).

147. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
148. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2098.
149. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
150. Maltz, supra note 60, at 958. See also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2098 ("[M]aterial
benefits cannot be the basis for the view that marriage counts as a fundamental right.
Material benefits of the most fundamental kind are involved in many programs involving
welfare and subsistence; and under current doctrine, they do not qualify as fundamental for
equal protection purposes.").
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7. Constitutional Text
Two final reasons for a right to marry have been asserted by the
Court: generic appeals to due process rights' and equal protection
rights.'52 These claims were neither explained nor justified by the Court
when they were made. Whether marriage is a substantive due process
right is the very question we are asking, so merely asserting that it is a
due process right cannot answer the question. And while one can easily
frame an argument that Person A has an equal protection right to marry
because he is just like Person B who is allowed to marry, this equal
protection argument does nothing to establish that all Persons, A, B,
C,... possess the fundamental right to marry, or what the right to marry
means. The due process and equal protection arguments for a
fundamental right to marry are conclusions in need of justification
themselves, not explanations.
The unsatisfactory array of justifications the Court has offered for
the doctrine of a fundamental right to marry only serves to highlight the
indeterminacy in the Court's treatment of marriage.
Rhetorical
flourishes and nods to tradition fill the opinions, but these provide little
guidance for fleshing out the boundaries of the fundamental right to
marry.
B. Deductive Approach: Reasoning from the Nature of Fundamental
Rights
If the Court's offered justifications for marriage as a fundamental
right do not provide an account of the boundaries of the right, perhaps
analyzing marriage as a fundamental right can provide insight into its
boundaries, based on the inherent characteristics of fundamental rights.
The idea of a "fundamental right" in itself is not original. Though its
original trek into substantive due process rights ended with
repudiation,'5 3 the Supreme Court has regularly relied upon and
referred to fundamental rights over the past forty years, and it has
continued using some fundamental rights declared during the Lochner
period. The Court's non-textual fundamental rights now include (1) the

151. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
152. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942).
153. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
See generally William G. Ross, When Did the "Switch in Time" Actually Occur?: Rediscovering the Supreme Court's "Forgotten" Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153
(2005).
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right to educate one's children as one chooses;154 (2) the right to raise
one's children as one chooses; 55 (3) the right to study German in a
private school;'56 (4) the freedom to associate and privacy in
associations;157 (5) the right of biologically related persons to live

together;58 (6) the right of married people to use contraceptives;'5 9 (7)
the right of unmarried people to use contraceptives;'6 (8) the right to
interstate travel; 6' and (9) the right to sexually intimate behavior. 62
Several themes are discernible in this eclectic collection of rights.

Many of them involve the intimacy of family life (child rearing and
education, family living arrangements, contraceptive use, sexual
intimacy). There is a sense of the need for privacy and autonomy
surrounding almost all of them.

And all of them involve negative

liberties (banning state action that coercively affects individual choices)
rather than positive liberties (forcing state action to benefit individuals).
A fundamental right to marry fits with the list in that it involves family
life and63intimate life, but it also does not fit because it is a positive
liberty. 1
The eclecticism of the listed rights illustrates the ad hoc nature of the

process of finding them. The Court has never articulated a systematic
way of identifying fundamental rights; indeed, it has essentially declared
such a systematic approach is impossible. 64 Legal observers have
154. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
155. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
156. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
157. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
158. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (city may
not use zoning ordinance to prevent grandson from living with grandmother). But see Vill. of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (allowing zoning ordinance to prevent six unrelated
college students to live together).
159. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
160. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
161. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250 (1974).
162. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
163. This fact by itself is enough to convince at least one commentator that marriage
cannot be a fundamental right. See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 (1996). See also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2094 ("We are speaking
here of fundamental rights, and rights protected as such are generally rights to be free from
government intrusion; they do not require affirmative provision by the state.").
164. See generally, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1992)
("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon
the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition
courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of
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analyzed and commented upon this approach, both critically and
complimentarily. 165 And though some have offered theories purporting
to expound a larger, organized logic behind the list of fundamental
rights,'66 none have authoritatively carried the day. It seems that we
cannot use the notion of a "fundamental right" itself to determine what
a "fundamental right to marry" must mean.
C. EssentialApproach: Reasoningfrom the Meaning of "Marriage"
The search for the meaning of the fundamental right to marry
requires resort to another methodology; namely, asking directly what
"marry" and "marriage" mean. The American Heritage College
Dictionary defines "marry" to mean "To join as spouses by exchanging
vows." "Spouse," in turn, means "A marriage partner." "Marriage"
means "The legal union of man and woman as husband and wife" or
"wedlock." "Wedlock" is "The state of being married," and "husband"
and "wife" are, respectively, male and female spouses. 167 It becomes
apparent from this circle of definitions that "marriage" is not something
susceptible to a simple or short definition.
Perhaps a legal dictionary offers a more useful explanation. Black's
Law Dictionary defines "marriage":
expression as a simple rule.... As Justice Harlan observed: 'Due process has not been
reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code.... If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it
certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation
might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the
traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing."' (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
165. Compare Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process,
ProceduralDue Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 892 (2003) (arguing
that certain recent Supreme Court attempts to limit the effect of substantive due process
rights are undesirable "for the broader structures of constitutional governance" and that
"[t]he doctrine can only be rationally shaped by a clearer understanding of and focus upon its
structure and internal logic"), with David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover
Unenumerated FundamentalRights? Cataloguingthe Methods of JudicialAlchemy, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 805 (1996) ("[T]he Supreme Court's methods are not scientific at
They are more like the methods of astrology, by which a visionary seer claims the
all ....
power to trace general but durable-sounding statements back to ambiguous symbols, from
which the interpreter insists they can be derived." (footnotes omitted)).
166. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 165; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993);
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND
THE RULE OF LAW (1998).
167. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 832, 1317, 1529, 664, 1542 (3d ed.
1997).
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marriage, n. 1. The legal union of a couple as husband
and wife. * The essentials of a valid marriage are (1)

parties legally capable of contracting to marry, (2)
mutual consent or agreement, and (3) an actual
contracting in the form prescribed by law. Marriage has
important consequences in many areas of the law, such as
torts, criminal law, evidence, debtor-creditor relations,

property, and contracts.'68
This definition boils down to "the legal union of a couple as husband
and wife as defined by law"-no help in determining the boundaries of a
fundamental right to marry.
The dictionaries confirm what anyone passingly familiar with
American society could readily say: marriage involves a complicated
labyrinth of practices, beliefs, legal regulations, and social
expectations. 169 In light of this reality, commentators on "marriage"
have often tried to break the concept down into smaller, more
manageable pieces. 7 ° Taking the same approach, let us note three
different theoretical approaches one might take toward defining the
boundaries of "marriage."
1. Marriage as Bounded by Government Decree
The state officially recognizes marriage in part because it seeks to
shape citizen behavior into socially desirable patterns.17 ' If this is the
168. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (8th ed. 2004).
169. Our definitional difficulties are not a recent phenomenon. "In an 1881 essay on the
confusion of American marriage law... Charles Noble bemoaned 'the contradictory and
indefinite rules which come to us from various parts of the United States, when we ask this
most fundamental of questions, 'What constitutes a valid marriage?"' GROSSBERG, supra
note 55, at 92 (quoting CHARLES NOBLE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS ON MARRIAGE

AND DIVORCE 28 (1881)). A more recent conclusion: "marriage has no theoretical
coherence." Homer, supra note 123, at 521.
170. See, e.g., E.J. Graff, What is MarriageFor?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 544 (2004)
(arguing that marriage means four things: an "inner bond" (commitment); a wedding
ceremony; a religious marriage; or government recognition of the bond between two people);
JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN

THE WESTERN TRADITION 2 (1997) (discussing four perspectives on marriage from the
Western Church: religious, social/legal, contractual, and naturalist). Witte finds "considerable
tension" between the four perspectives because they have "competing claims of ultimate
authority over the form and function of marriage." Id.
171. "Society attaches benefits to marriage because the married have undertaken crucial
social responsibilities; those benefits help to carry them out-chiefly the legal, moral, and
economic responsibilities to care for each other and for the children of their marriage."

2006]

QUESTIONING THE RIGHT TO MARRY

purpose of marriage, then the boundaries of marriage are a function of
the behavior determined by the legislature to be socially desirable. If
marriage consists of a set of laws establishing some people as married
and others as unmarried, and if the laws treat the two groups differently
for some purposes, then marriage is a state registration and licensing
scheme: a form of government categorization.
The notion of marriage as a registration and licensing scheme has
two implications. First, the government licenses people (for hunting,
operating automobiles, flying, serving as an accountant) and categorizes
people (over eighteen, resident of New York, government employee,
dependent) all of the time, yet these licenses and categories are not
considered to be fundamental rights. Therefore, if it is to be a
fundamental right, marriage must also be more than just a licensing
scheme. Second, if the state creates marriage as a licensing or
registration scheme, it can define the boundaries of that scheme-who is
eligible to marry, how marriage is entered into, and the rights,
responsibilities, and consequences attached to being married.
2.

Marriage as Bounded by Supra-Governmental Source

In
some
sense
marriage
pre-exists
the
state,
both
chronologically/historically (because people married before the rise of
the modern nation-state) and jurisprudentially.'
In this sense, marriage
is a right which is not conferred by the state, but which is rather above
or prior to the state. This implies that marriage is a structure existing
irrespective of the state, which the state may utilize, accommodate, or
work around (like the laws of physics, or the parent-child relationship),
but which it cannot abolish or alter.' 3 Under this view, the terms of
marriage are set, at least to some extent, independently of the state.174
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: HOW WE DESTROY LASTING

LOVE 137-38 (1996). "Marriage is a socially arranged solution for the problem of getting
people to stay together and care for children that the mere desire for children, and the sex
that makes children possible, does not solve." JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE
PROBLEM: How OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 41 (2002).

172. "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse .... Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
173. Cf.Homer, supra note 123, at 517. "The theory that marriage has an essential core,
one that precedes the state, has a different tenor: marriage is not so much a service that the
state must provide, but an essentialized entity around which the state must conform." Id.
However, Homer ultimately rejects this theory.
174. This idea, so intuitive to earlier generations that it was not always articulated, was
nicely exhibited by Justice Harlan in his famous dissent in Poe. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It is one thing when the State exerts its power either
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Such a theory of marriage obviously requires a second piece: a source
external to the state that defines the boundaries of marriage.
3.

Marriage as Bounded by Individual Preferences

Marriage is commonly referred to as a "contract."' 175 This paradigm
implies that marriage is simply an agreement created between rational
individuals. Because the individuals form the contract, they should be
able to set the terms of it themselves-which means the state does not
set the terms.
The contract theory of marriage is logical, but it does not entirely
reflect the reality of marriage as it has ever been or is currently
practiced. 176 Common social understandings about normal human
conduct create the social space for marriage to exist as something
qualitatively different from a commercial contract; marriage cannot be a
purely private contract and remain "marriage."' 177 For it to have any
independent significance as a fundamental right, marriage must have
some recognized term or terms to differentiate it from contracts which
are not fundamental rights. 178 In the Anglo-American tradition, a
governing authority (church or state) has, by statute, provided and
enforced marriage terms since 1534; 171 individuals have (theoretically)
to forbid extra-marital sexuality... or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when,
having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by
means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy." (emphasis added)). Harlan suggests
that the state can choose to take or leave marriage, but if it chooses to take it-to regulate
it-it is bound by the "inherent" nature of marriage. See Ball, supra note 49, at 1194-95.
175. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) ("Marriage, while from its
very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and
usually regulated by law.").
176. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND

THE LAW xv (1981) ("[T]here is an implicit contract that governs every marriage-an
unwritten contract that is imposed by law. Clearly, this 'marriage contract' is unlike most
contracts: its provisions are unwritten, its penalties are unspecified, and the terms of the
contract are typically unknown to the contracting parties. Nor are prospective spouses
allowed any options about these terms.").
177. "Marriage is a sexual option carved out of nature by law, faith, custom, and society.
In other words, to have the choice as individuals to marry we must first choose as a society to
create marriage." GALLAGHER, supra note 171, at 9. Even under the marriage-as-contract
theory, at least some official definition of "marriage" seems necessary to give the term
meaning separate from the ordinary economic contracting that individuals, banks, and
businesses engage in every day.
178. This observation separates the right to marry from the specter of Lochnerismconstitutional protection for the general right to contract. In contrast to economic contracts,
marriage during the Lochner period remained heavily state-regulated. See infra Part V.A.
179. "A parliamentary Act of 1534 gave the Archbishop of Canterbury powers to grant
such licenses and dispensations as had formerly been granted by the Pope...." R.B.
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only opted between entering into the official form of marriage or
remaining outside of it.
That said, individuals today have wide latitude to determine for
themselves the responsibilities and conduct within their marriages. The
government's established boundaries for marriage do not extend to
dictate intimate conduct within a marriage, such as living arrangements,
allocation of domestic responsibilities, and sexual
financial cooperation,
behavior."8
Even with such brief descriptions of the three theories, it is apparent
that contemporary marriage does not fit perfectly into any of these
categories but rather straddles all three of them. States legislate the
boundaries of marriage, but most people have some prototypical idea of
what marriage should mean, so that radically different legal boundaries
of marriage would seem strange (even illegitimate) to them. And while
the state can legislate what relationships are given the label "marriage,"
modern privacy doctrine renders illegitimate most state attempts to
control actual behavior within marriage, with the result that individuals
do set many of the most important terms of their marriage contracts.
One way of dealing with the cross-cutting theories of "marriage" is
to recognize that the word "marriage" might have multiple meaningsConsider
meanings related to one another but not identical.
''examination" as an example of such a word: in a legal context,
''examination" can mean an attorney's questioning of a witness during a
trial; but "examination" can also mean a doctor's procedure to assess a
patient's health;'81 a teacher's procedure to assess a student's
knowledge; ' 82 or even a thinker's or writer's grappling with a problem in
an attempt to explain it.' 83 Similarly, "marriage" invokes a wide range

OUTHWAITE, CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1850 6 (1995).

180. See Mary Anne Case, MarriageLicenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765 (2005) ("[A]
married couple is by and large free to have or not have sex, vaginal or not, procreative,
contracepted, or otherwise; to be faithful or not, to divorce and remarry, to commingle
finances or keep them separate, to live together or separately, to differentiate their roles or
share all tasks, to publicize their relationship or be discreet about it, while still having their
commitment to one another recognized by third parties including the state.").
181. For example, "Dr. Smith's examination confirmed that the wound was infected."
182. "John's examination proved he was able to solve differential equations and recite
the capitals of Africa."
183. "The paper argued that examination of the statute in light of constitutional free
speech doctrine would show that the statute's ban on certain campaign donations was
impermissible."
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of concepts, which overlap substantially but which also diverge in
important ways. 84
4.

Marriage as Personal Relationship

From the perspective of a particular individual, "marriage" refers to
a relationship between him or herself and another person which both of
them understand to require certain behavior of themselves and which
they both understand to grant certain legitimate expectations regarding
the behavior of the other spouse. This might be called "personalmarriage." A personal-marriage (or a collection of personal-marriages)
should not be confused with the larger social ideal of marriage, or the
government's classifications of some relationships as marriages: "It is
important to distinguish the individual interests in domestic relations
from the social interest in the family and marriage as social
institutions." '85
5.

Marriage as Ideology

From the perspective of society as a whole, "marriage" refers to
commonly held beliefs about the operation of personal-marriages.
"Marriage" is a collective understanding of what constitutes and creates
a personal-marriage, how spouses within a personal-marriage should
behave, and how outsiders to a personal-marriage should treat the
arrangement and the spouses within it. 8 This set of social beliefs might
184. People tend to understand that there are different meanings of the word
"marriage," though they may not realize it. Consider Representative Barney Frank's famous
question to Henry Hyde during the debate over the Defense of Marriage Act: "If other
people are immoral, how does it demean your marriage?" Frank was distinguishing between
Hyde's personal-marriage and the legal-marriage regime Hyde was advocating. See David B.
Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive
Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 950 n.129 (2001).
185. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177,
177 (1916). Similarly, "[W]e need to distinguish the 'meaning' of marriage as an institution
the state has an interest in recognizing and regulating, from the 'meaning' of marriage as
supplied by religious or other civil associations." Connie S. Rosati, What is the "Meaning" of
"Marriage"?42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2005).
186. Nancy Cott argues, "To be marriage, the institution requires public affirmation. It
requires public knowledge-at least some publicity beyond the couple themselves; that is why
witnesses are required for the ceremony and why wedding bells ring." NANCY F. COTT,
PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 1-2 (2000). This assertion is
questionable as applied to any particular couple; most people would probably accept a
marriage conducted in secret and kept from the public eye as a real marriage. However,
Cott's point is insightful as applied to the institution of marriage. The institution retains
vitality and relevance through regular public participation in it; this participation in turn
creates shared expectations about the meaning of marriage. Such shared expectations might
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be called "popular-marriage." There might be more than one popularmarriage current within a single society at the same time, if the people
are divided among multiple understandings of what constitutes a
personal-marriage.
Obviously, there is a close relationship between personal-marriage
and popular-marriage.
Popular-marriage largely defines personalmarriage because individuals entering into a personal-marriage are
likely to have their understanding of their own personal-marriage
shaped by the prevailing social consensus about marriage. However, a
personal-marriage may differ from the popular-marriage if the
particular spouses agree on a unique course of behavior between
themselves.
Philosophical or religious beliefs may play a significant role in
shaping popular-marriage. If many people in a society believe that
marriage practices should be defined by an account of marriage that
comes from a particular source external to themselves, 87' then that
account will coincide with a popular-marriage. One might call such a
philosophical or religious account of marriage a "natural-law
marriage."8
6. Marriage as Legal Status
From the legal perspective, "marriage" refers to a certain
relationship between people that the government recognizes as having
particular consequences different from the consequences attached to a
relationship between random strangers or between parent and child.
This might be called "legal-marriage."
In a state with a representative government, the boundaries of legalmarriage will be driven by social understandings of what marriage
should mean-that is to say, by popular-marriage. The state will try to
make its legal-marriage the same as the prevailing popular-marriage.
However, once a definition of legal marriage is enshrined, that

include the duty to recognize, support, and affirm the marital unit; acceptance of a sexual
relationship within the unit as legitimate; and recognition of the unit as a family which can
include children.
187. Possibilities include divine mandate, natural law, and pure reason.
188. Robert George's "one-flesh communion of persons" is perhaps the most wellknown natural-law marriage recently advanced in law journals. See, e.g., Robert P. George,
What's Sex Got to Do with It? Marriage,Morality, and Rationality, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 71
(2004); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriageand the Liberal Imagination, 84
GEO. L.J. 301, 301-02 (1995). However, any account of marriage claiming to derive its
legitimacy from universal principals could properly be called a natural-law marriage.
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definition will work to shape popular-marriage, because people will see
the legal-marriage definition coercively enforced by the power and
prestige of the state.189

The state's treatment of legal-marriage might involve requiring
certain formalities before a relationship is officially recognized. Or, the
state might declare that all relationships having certain characteristics
will be considered legal-marriages. Either way, the state will be forced

to create an account of marriage by which to measure either applicants
for official recognition or relationships that some litigant claims deserve
legal treatment as a legal-marriage.
When it attempts to establish the boundaries of legal-marriage, the

state might encounter difficulty if there are multiple popular-marriages.
That is, if there is social dissensus as to what personal-marriage means

(whether in who may marry or in what responsibilities and behaviors
marriage requires), political conflict will result. The representative
government may respond by recognizing multiple (different) popularmarriages as arrangements which qualify as legal-marriage when
reduced to practice in a personal-marriage. Alternatively, if a majority
subscribes to the same popular-marriage, that majority may be able to
establish its own popular-marriage as the sole template for legal-

marriage.190
There is public-private tension in the concept of legal-marriage. An
account of legal-marriage is necessary because the state (especially the
court system) must deal with the social reality of personal-marriage and

popular-marriage-whether it is settling disputes over dissolved
personal-marriages (such as asset distribution or child custody) or
189. See, e.g., COTr, supranote 186, at 8 ("In shaping an institution like marriage, public
authorities work by defining the realm of cognitive possibility for individuals as much as
through external policing. Law and society stand in a circular relation: social demands put
pressure on legal practices, while at the same time the law's public authority frames what
people can envision for themselves and can conceivably demand."); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 70 (1980) ("The
Iprophecies' of people in power have an inevitably self-fulfilling character, even when what is
being 'prophesied' is popular opinion.... [T]he fact that things turned out as the Supreme
Court predicted may prove only that the Supreme Court is the Supreme Court. Thus by
predicting the future the justices will unavoidably help shape it .... ").
190. Conflict over the content of legal-marriage between proponents of the differing
popular-marriages is likely to be intense because an established legal-marriage will eventually
change public opinion to more closely conform to the official legal-marriage. Legal-marriage,
in other words, has a tendency to conform popular-marriage to itself. This happens because
legal-marriage is imposed as a solution on individuals who resort to the courts to settle
disputes within their own personal-marriage, and these results are reported through the
media.
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settling disputes in which one party claims the existence of a personalmarriage should affect the outcome (such as who will make decisions on
behalf of an incapacitated person or claims of wrongful treatment within
a relationship).'9 1 Thus, legal-marriage is an intensely public concept.
Yet modern American popular-marriage considers a personal-marriage
to be the most intimate of relationships, the place where majority
opinion has little authority to dictate how lives are conducted. This
tension within legal-marriage parallels our original problem, the
constitutional law tension between state regulation of marriage and
marriage as a fundamental right.
D. The Origin of the Right to Marry Conundrum
Our three theories of the origin of marriage boundaries roughly map
onto the common usages of the word "marriage":
Usage

Theory

Personal-marriage

--

marriage as personal contract

Popular-marriage/natural-law-marriage

-

marriage as autonomous concept

Legal-marriage

4

marriage as state-created relationship

This correspondence suggests that the proper constitutional
understanding of "marriage" in a given context could be determined by
which type of marriage (and thus which theory) is being referenced by
the vague term "marriage." It suggests that a given use of "marriage"
might be ambiguous; we may not be able to determine from context
which type of marriage is intended. Most disturbingly, it suggests that

191. Maggie Gallagher puts it quite colorfully:

[T]he family, alone among the major structures of our society, remains
stubbornly preliberal. The family cannot be rationalized according to the

forms of bureaucracy because it is not rational. Why pour out your sweat
and blood, why shed your tears for this child and not that one? Oh, it was

your sperm, you say? Are you mad? Yes, quite mad. No family policy
that ignores this universal human madness can possibly succeed.
GALLAGHER, supra note 171, at 240. Also, marriage has an unavoidable shaping effect on a

nation's population: "No modern nation-state can ignore marriage forms, because of their
direct impact on reproducing and composing the population." CO-rT, supra note 186, at 5.
192. Compare this scheme with the tripartite scheme offered by Connie Rosati involving

"three types of talk about marriage": (1) marriage as multipurpose union (descriptive and
normative); (2) marriage as a legal institution that creates a binding relationship; (3) "richly
normative" marriage as a "fundamental moral relation between partners" (irrespective of
legal status). Rosati, supra note 185, at 1013-15.
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the unreflective carrying of statements about "marriage" from one
context to another in reasoning about marriage might lead to illogical
conclusions, because a statement about personal-marriage might not be
true about legal-marriage, and vice versa. 93
So which meaning of "marriage" is the Supreme Court using when it
refers to the "fundamental right to marry"?
In general, the Supreme Court has meant legal-marriage when using
the word "marriage," and the Court's holdings in the right-to-marry
cases fit well with an interpretation of the fundamental right to marry as
a right to legal-marry. Loving declared that the fundamental right to
marry prevented states from disallowing interracial legal-marriages; the
context was a miscegenation prosecution, but the clear implication of
the Court's holding was that the state must give interracial marriages the
same legal recognition as intraracial ones. 94 Turner obligated the state
to accommodate a prisoner's desire to legal-marry. 95 Zablocki held the
state's denial of legal-marriage to the plaintiff a violation of his
fundamental right to marry. 96 These three cases forced the state
governments to change their legal-marriage regimes to accommodate
plaintiffs seeking admission to them.
It seems like declaring the obvious to conclude that the Court has
meant legal-marry when talking about the fundamental right to marry,
but this conclusion and the analysis leading up to it show how deep the
conundrum contained within the "fundamental right to marry" runs.
Having picked apart several different meanings for "marriage," we have
discovered that the theory behind legal-marriage is marriage as a statecreated social policy tool, which suggests that the state can define the
boundaries of marriage however it chooses." However, the theory
193. Take the "examination" example. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right
to examination of witnesses as evidence at trial. However, this does not mean a defendant
always has the right to give a witness a medical examination at trial or to give an academic
examination to a witness at trial. One step further, the idea of a defendant having a
constitutional right to engage in examination in the sense of philosophical inquiry at trial is
ridiculous, even nonsensical.
194. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
195. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
196. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
197. This view is supported by the decisions upholding state restrictions on legalmarriage. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding polygamy ban as
constitutional); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (ignoring legally valid marriage
to uphold criminal conviction for fraudulently evading the immigration law); Wyatt v. United
States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960) (ignoring legally valid marriage and requiring wife to testify
against husband because husband was prostituting wife before they were married). For cases
upholding state prohibitions on incestuous relationships, see Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-
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behind a fundamental right to marry militates against allowing coercive
state regulation of legal-marriage. A "fundamental right to marry" and
legal-marriage, on this account, are incompatible.
Perhaps, though, this theoretical incompatibility is irrelevant. In
light of the Court's ubiquitous references to tradition when talking
about marriage, one might guess that there exists an historical
understanding of the boundaries of marriage driving the "fundamental
right to marry" jurisprudence. Even without a theory behind it, a
historical approach toward defining the boundaries of legal-marriage
seems promising, especially in light of the commonness of personalmarriage. Personal-marriage surrounds us and affects our beliefs and
behaviors without us even pausing to consider why this should be so. In
that sense, personal-marriage is similar to gravity or traffic control
devices-we usually do not contemplate them; we simply adjust our
behavior to accommodate the effects they have on us. Maybe legalmarriage is like obscenity-we can't define it, but we "know it when
[we] see it. '
This explanation is superficially attractive, but a little historical
inquiry shows it to be incorrect. Legal-marriage is not something whose
definition everyone has agreed upon for most of history; it has been
often contested and occasionally changed. 199 But though the "know it
when we see it" theory turns out to be objectively incorrect, it
nonetheless contains a valuable insight: the courts have acted as if it is
correct. This error has allowed marriage jurisprudence based on an old
social consensus about marriage to persist, though the foundation of the
legal doctrine is no longer extant. In short, the Court's current
treatment of the fundamental right to marry is incoherent, and the
history of Western marriage regulation explains why.

Sex Marriage,Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on
Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543, 1566 n.95
(2005).
198. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).

199. See, e.g., Graff, supra note 170, at 546 ("[M]arriage has always been a battleground,
owned and defined first by one group and then another. While marriage may retain its
ancient name, very little else in this city has remained the same...."); STEPHANIE COONTZ,
MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE To INTIMACY, OR How LOVE CONQUERED

MARRIAGE 11 (2005) ("If we can learn anything from the past, it is how few precedents are
now relevant in the changed marital landscape in which we operate today.").
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CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE ROOTS: HISTORY OF WESTERN
MARRIAGE REGULATION

A. History of Western MarriageRegulation

Personal-marriage as a practice goes far, far back in human
history. 2°
However, large-scale state regulation and licensing of
marriage (legal-marriage) is a much more recent phenomenon. In
Roman times, the state established a few marital eligibility rules
(citizens needed permission to marry a foreigner and "could not marry
slaves or prostitutes") but other than that "did not get involved in
ratifying marriage or divorce." 2° ' For Romans, marriage could be
accomplished by a man and a woman moving in together and having
marital intent.2 2 Thus, before (and during) the rise of the Catholic
Church, marriage was an arrangement entered with little difficulty. The
legal and social effects of personal-marriage were determined by social
norms (popular-marriage).2 3
As the Catholic Church gained ascendance in Europe, both as belief
system and as agent exercising social control, it sought ways to enforce
its teachings on sexuality and marriage-to conform individual behavior
to its understanding of moral behavior. The Church's canon law
prohibited "sodomy, adultery, pedophilia, fornication, and 'eager
gazing' on women.., bestiality, polygyny and polyandry. ' '204 Marriage,
which alone legitimated sexual activity, was considered a sacrament, and
divorce was prohibited. 5 Eventually, the canon law was considered
"the one universal law of the West," and the Church enforced it upon all
persons . 206
Such a regime required clear rules about entry into marriage.
Church doctrine declared mutual consent between a man and a woman
sufficient to create a marriage. 207 This, however, created problems.
200. See, e.g., CooNTz, supra note 199, at 34-77.
201. Id. at 79.
202. Id. at 79-80.
203. See Graff, supra note 170, at 545 ("Our medieval ancestors did not need civil
marriage. Most of them lived in small villages where everyone knew who was married-with
or without a ceremony-and who was not."); COONTZ, supra note 199, at 111 ("Neighbors [in
the Middle Ages] had many ways to prevent or punish matches they considered
inappropriate.").
204. WITTE, supra note 170, at 19.
205. Id. at 26-30, 36.
206. Id. at 30-31.
207. Under canon law, "A valid and indissoluble marriage was effected when a man and
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Individuals could, and did, marry clandestinely.'
These secret
marriages could be disclaimed by one spouse against the wishes of the
other; conversely, an individual could falsely claim he or she had
secretly married another, thus potentially marrying that person against
his or her will. Once marriage was established in the eyes of the Church,
it was permanent-and carried heavy consequences for almost every
aspect of one's life.2°9
These consequences included strictly
differentiated domestic sex roles; the man was required to be the
husband/provider/legal representative of the marriage unit, while the
woman was required to be a wife/dependant/domestic worker without
separate legal personality.21
Additionally, the two members of the
couple were considered to merge into a single legal person, represented
in the person of the husband. The wife lost all legal identity."'
Evidentiary problems in evaluating claims of marriage, the loss of
control over the descent of property caused by children marrying
without their parent's knowledge, and the desire to prevent individuals
from secretly marrying and divorcing pushed the Church to find a way
of controlling marriage.1 2 It began formally licensing marriages and
requiring public marriage ceremonies as an attempt to cut down on
secret marriages. 213 Thus, when popular-marriage did not conform
marital and sexual behavior to Church expectations (the Church's
natural-law-marriage), the Church created legal-marriage to regulate
personal-marriage behavior2
As secular governments became increasingly powerful, they began
to compete with the Church for control over marriage. 25" The Protestant
Reformation allowed governments in Protestant areas to take charge of
marriage licensing because, unlike Catholic teaching, Protestant

a woman who were free to do so exchanged words in the present tense indicating their
consent to be husband and wife. There was no necessity for any ceremony, publicity,
witnesses, or consent by any other parties ....
" ERIC JOSEF CARLSON, MARRIAGE AND THE
ENGLISH REFORMATION 18 (1994).
208. OUTHWAITE, supra note 179.
209. See COONTZ, supra note 199, at 106-09.

210. In 1753, a marriage license was "something like a certificate of ownership of the
wife, entitling the husband to her property, her body and its products, including the labor she

engaged in for wages and the labor that produced offspring; obliging him to provide for her
care and feeding." Case, supra note 180, at 1768.
211. COONTZ, supra note 199, at 115, 186.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 106-07.
Id.; OUTHWAITE, supra note 179, at 4.
Id.
Conr, supra note 186, at 5.
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theology did not consider marriage a sacrament, and thus did not
consider direct church control of legal-marriage necessary or
desirable. 1 6 Though regulation of marriage began shifting from church

to state, religious doctrine still shaped the substantive content of
marriage regulation.2 7 Protestant political units sought to "tame"
sexuality and prevent people from marrying merely out of sexual
desire." 8 Legal-marriage had been wrested from the church, but its
boundaries continued to be defined by the church's natural-law-

marriage.
This is the context in which marriage regulation was initially
exported to the English colonies in North America: the government
exercised marital controls based on a Christian view of marriage and
morality." 9

However, by the time of American independence, the

Christian moral-behavior justification for legal-marriage began to be
supplemented in the United States with another view of the purpose of
legal-marriage: creating virtuous republican citizens through virtuous
republican families centered on virtuous republican marriages.22 °
216.

WITTE,

supra note 170, at 42-43.

217. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 3 (1974)

("There was never an English law of marriage apart from that administered by the Church
courts."); WITTE,

supra note 170, at 5-9.

218. See WILSON, supra note 171, at 78 ("Protestants objected to the Church's
willingness to recognize secret or informal marriages even though that willingness had a long
philosophical history. To reformers, however, that recognition would encourage people to
marry 'on the basis of sexual desire alone.' As historian Steven Ozment put it, Protestants
wanted to 'tame the old Adam in human nature, not strengthen it.' Wherever Protestants
came to power, they challenged secret marriages by insisting, to the extent they could, that
some public ceremony was necessary and by creating secular courts to oversee marital

affairs."

(quoting

STEVEN

OZMENT,

WHEN

FATHERS

RULED:

FAMILY

LIFE

IN

REFORMATION EUROPE 28 (1983))).
219. See WITrE, supra note 170, at 10 ("The Anglican commonwealth model [of
marriage] prevailed in much of Great Britain and its many colonies across the Atlantic.");
COTT, supra note 186, at 9 ("The common sense of British colonials at the time of the
American Revolution was Christian; Christian common sense took for granted the rightness
of monogamous marriage.... Learned knowledge deemed monogamy a God-given but also
a civilized practice, a natural right that stemmed from a subterranean basis in natural law.").
220. COT, supra note 186, at 9, 18-21. "The colonial family's status as a vital link in the
colonial chain of authority provided the major rationale for its internal organization."
GROSSBERG, supra note 55, at 5.
Marriage law guarded the entrance to the republican household. In the
1790s Connecticut Supreme Court Reporter Jesse Root voiced the central
assumptions of nuptial law when he declared that the idea that "one man
should be joined to one woman in a constant society of cohabiting
together, is agreeable to the order of nature, is necessary for the
propagation of their offspring, and to render clear and certain the right of
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As the new nation launched into the 1800s, the republic-shaping
view of marriage was in turn challenged by Enlightenment-inspired
individualism and the growing belief in free contract principles, both of
which argued against expansive state regulation of marriage. 2 ' This
individualist enthusiasm caused a contraction in public regulation of
marriage on all levels (family, community, and state) during the first half
of the nineteenth century, with private contracting and dispute
resolution in courts filling the void left by the retreating state.222 As a
result, informal marriages flourished.
The courts responded by
developing the doctrine of common-law marriage."
During this period, as the republic-shaping view and then the
private-contract view of marriage held ascendance, legal-marriage (and
popular-marriage) began to slowly, almost imperceptibly, separate from
their theoretical foundation on Christian natural-law-marriage. The
republic-shaping
view
of
marriage
had
social-instrumental
underpinnings, and the private-contract view was based on notions of
individual consent alone.2
However, inertia kept the substantive

succession." Root offered a lawyerly version of the popular belief that
stable marriages performed critical roles in the society by producing
healthy children, curbing sexual passions, and protecting private
accumulation. Faith in those assumptions never wavered.
Id. at 18.
221. See WILSON, supra note 171, at 87 ("The Enlightenment took root in England and
Scotland in ways that slowly but inevitably led to a redefinition of marriage as an agreement
between two people with individual rights rather than as a partnership made sacred by law,
custom, and God.").
222. WITrE, supra note 170, at 70.
223. GROSSBERG, supra note 55, at 67-74. A lack of formal state authority did not
mean marriage was unregulated, though.
When couples married informally, or reversed the order of divorce and
remarriage, they were not simply acting privately, taking the law into their
own hands.... The surrounding local community provided the public
oversight necessary. Without resort to the state apparatus, local informal
policing by the community affirmed that marriage was a well-defined
public institution as well as a contract made by consent.
CoIrr, supra note 186, at 37. And "courts' recognition of informal marriage silently
incorporated a particular definition of 'matrimony' and its 'duties and obligations.' In
accepting self-marriage, state authority did not retreat, but widened the ambit of its
enforcement of marital duties." Id. at 40.
224. By the mid-1800s, "In a society that had disestablished religion and enshrined
individual rights, most kin nuptials fell outside of the shrinking domain of public regulatory
authority." GROSSBERG, supra note 55, at 111. "Marital unions were increasingly defined as

private compacts with public ramifications rather than social institutions with roles and duties
fixed by the place of the family in a hierarchical social order. .... [This process] reinforced
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content of the marriage regulation mostly static, even when a sense of
family crisis prompted re-regulation of marriage following the Civil

War.225
The return of state legislatures to marriage in the last half of the
nineteenth century forced courts to decide cases which pitted old
common-law marriage rules against new statutes. The new statutes
required that personal-marriages be solemnized by certain formalities in
order for them to qualify as legal-marriages, but these formalities were
often ignored by couples. Upon the death of a property-holder, disputes
could arise over the estate, with one side claiming the existence of a
valid legal-marriage and the other saying the formalities had not been
observed so the marriage could not be given legal effect in probate. The
responses of judges to such controversies illustrated the uncertainty
surrounding the nature of legal-marriage, for they often ignored226 the
unambiguous command of the statutes in favor of the common law.
Ebb and flow of the extent of marriage regulation aside, the nowentrenched non-religious theories behind legal-marriage (the socialinstrumental view and the private consent view) made it possible for
states to begin changing the boundaries of legal-marriage in ways
contrary to religious teachings, most notably in easing access to
common-law authority over marriage, and thus encouraged judges to define the legal
boundaries of nuptials." Id. at 20. In an 1834 treatise, Justice Joseph Story called marriage
"more than a mere contract" but also an "institution of society" with "peculiarities" not
present in ordinary contracts. Id. at 21 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICTS OF LAW 100

(1834)).

225. The reformers who successfully pushed for increased state regulation of marriage
emphasized the status nature of marriage and the public interest in it against the contractual
aspects of it. Id. at 92; see generally id. at 83-86. "At the turn of the twentieth century,
English and American legislatures treated marriage much the same way that the Catholic
leaders of Trent and the Protestant leaders of Wittenberg, Geneva, and Westminster had
done in the sixteenth century." WITTE, supra note 170, at 194. This inertia was partially due
the persistence among many people of belief in the old natural law basis for marriage. See for
example, Joel Bishop's treatise defining marriage as
a civil status, existing in
for those civil and social
sex. Its source is the
municipal law of every
nations.

one man and one woman, legally united for life,
purposes which are founded in the distinction of
law of nature, whence it has flowed into the
civilized country, and into the general law of

JOEL BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 25 (Boston,

1852), quoted in GROSSBERG, supra note 55, at 23.

226. Clear statement rules provided a convenient means of accomplishing this task.
"Judges preserved much of their discretion by retaining the axiom that marital regulations
without explicit language making them compulsory were only directory." GROSSBERG, supra
note 55, at 95.
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divorce. 27 While marriage rhetoric remained Christian (public figures
spoke of marriage as a self-existent, traditional institution), underneath
its rhetorical surface legal-marriage was abandoning the boundaries of
religious natural-law-marriage for boundaries defined by popular
preferences. 21
As the 1900s began, the abandonment of the traditional natural-lawmarriage template was reinforced and speeded by industrialization and
new ideals about the status of women, who entered the workforce on a
large scale and sought treatment as coequals with men. The increasing
independence of women brought the former political citizenship nature
of marriage into question, for now all persons had a direct relationship
with the state regardless of marital status. 22' A changing society began
and
of husband/provider
structure
the
marital
discarding
wife/dependent homemaker, thus removing another holdover piece of
The gradual (theoretical) general
medieval natural-law-marriage.
rejection of laws intended solely to enforce moral values changed legalmarriage by rendering its original justification-moral coercionillegitimate. 2" By the 1920s, Christian sexual mores were also slowly
being discarded, and the legal-marriage monopoly on socially acceptable
The new popular-marriage had rejected
sexual activity was broken.'
both on sex roles within marriage
the old natural-law-marriage teaching
2312
it.
without
behavior
sexual
and
The process of dismantling state regulation of sexuality was slow,
however. Court decisions continued to reaffirm state power to regulate
sexual activity for decades after common practice had embraced

227. Legislative revisions of divorce rules showed that "[f]ar from being an institution
fixed by God, marriage was in the hands of the legislature. The legislative legerdemain of the
antebellum decades taught the lesson that 'rightful and formal' marriage was political, rather
than simply natural or God-given." CoTT, supra note 186, at 54.
228. Id. at 46-47, 219.
229. "The prior relation between marriage and citizenship became 'as archaic as the

doctrine of ordeal by fire' once women had the ballot, a Massachusetts congressman
remarked." Id. at 164.
230. The key figure in this process was John Stuart Mill, who wrote against the state
imposing theologically-based social arrangements. Mill forcefully proclaimed the absolute

equality of men and women and envisioned marriage as an arrangement of "liberty and
affection, shaped by the preferences of wife and husband, not the prescriptions of church and
state." WITTE, supra note 170, at 201.
231. COTr, supra note 186, at 159-61.

232. After 1900, "new patterns in women's lives were not simple or unidirectional and
neither were signals about the institution of marriage. One shift was clear: government
authorities eased up on political and moral strictures about marriage and concentrated more
on enforcing its economic usefulness." Id. at 157.
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extramarital sexuality. 233 And the growth of the administrative state
during the Depression and following World War II saw marriage
revived as a convenient tool for government economic treatment of the
family."4
In the 1960s, though, the effects of the social change began to be felt
in law. The "Enlightenment contractarian model" of marriage was
"implemented legally." 5 The Supreme Court began to strike down
government attempts to regulate individual sexual and marital behavior,
proclaiming individual liberty to live a life of one's own choosing.236
With its skeleton of sex roles rejected, its monopoly on sexuality
broken, and its religious justification discarded, marriage was loudly
questioned in the 1970s. 7 Still, out of habit (and, for some, a lingering
belief in natural-law-marriage) people continued to enter into legalmarriage. The marriage shell began to be filled by a new popularmarriage, which redefined legal-marriage in solely personal termsprivacy, personal fulfillment, and autonomy. 23 s An institution whose
shape and meaning is determined by each individual in terms of his or
her personal preferences will lead to varying interpretations, and in the
1980s and 1990s, legal-marriage became the object of progressively
greater political conflict as people advocating inconsistent popularmarriages struggled to have their own models enshrined as the legal one.
B. Implicationsfor the FundamentalRight to Marry
What does this history say about the "fundamental right to marry"?
Under the traditional regime (where legal-marriage was rationalized as
233. See generally Dubler, supra note 108.
234. "New Deal policy innovations revivified the fading connection between citizenship
and marital role through economic avenues. These choices diluted the formal political
equality of women and deeply imprinted marriage on citizenship entitlements, while
refiguring what those entitlements were." COTT, supra note 186, at 174.
235. WITTE,supra note 170, at 10-11.
236. "Today... every constitutionally recognized aspect of liberty legal marriage
formerly monopolized (sex, cohabitation, reproduction, parenting, etc.) seems, as a matter of
constitutional right, no longer within the state's or marriage's monopoly control." Case,
supra note 180, at 1769. See also Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The
Incredible Retreat of Law from the Regulation of Marriage,63 LA. L. REV. 243 (2003).
237. See COTT, supra note 186, at 212.
238. "[M]id-twentieth-century discourse saw the hallmarks of the institution [of
marriage] in liberty and privacy, consent and freedom." Id. at 197. "The legal, social, and
economic supports that sustained marriage over centuries have dispatched with astonishing
speed, and marriage has been reconceived as a purely private act, not a social institution but
one possible scenario, sustained entirely by and for two individuals for their own mutual
pleasure." GALLAGHER, supra note 171, at 7.
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the state's tool to enforce Christian morality and particular sex roles for
men and women), one could propound two reasons why individuals had
a fundamental right to legal-marry.
First, in the context of government regulation of sexual behavior by
a Christian moral standard, the "right to procreate" implies a right to
marry.3 The right to procreate is meaningless unless one also has a
right to enter into the only legal status in which one can legally engage

in procreative (sexual) behavior, and traditional laws against adultery
and fornication made civil marriage necessary for a couple who wished
2 40
to have a sexual relationship without the risk of criminal prosecution.
Second, if marriage is a natural law concept, then the state cannot
legitimately prevent individuals from entering into marriage as defined
by the natural law. Since natural law is prior to and higher than the

state's law, the state can only use its authority to enforce the marriage
24 1
boundaries which have been separately established by the natural law.

The rhetoric in the Supreme Court's early marriage cases reflects
these two considerations. Zablocki itself made the point about marriage
242
being the only legal gateway to procreation. 2 Meister seemed to have a

natural-law-marriage in mind when it declared that marriage statutes
"do not confer the right" to marry. 243 Murphy v. Ramsey appealed to
the natural-law "idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from
the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of
matrimony., 244 Meyer considered the right to "marry, establish a home
and bring up children" as "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness,"
another natural law theory.245 Justice Douglas' equation of marriage
and procreation in Skinner reflected the Christian natural law view.246
239. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
240. The traditional intertwining of procreation and marriage appears starkly in Skinner.
There, the facts and holding had nothing to do with marriage; the case was about involuntary
sterilization of convicts. Nevertheless, the Court mentioned procreation and marriage
together: "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Clearly, procreation can occur without
marriage; this statement tells us nothing about biology but a lot about social attitudes toward
sex and marriage in 1942.
241. "When state legislators went about altering marriage in response to social and
economic pressures, they did so with some ambivalence, looking above and behind them as
though a more powerful presence were watching." CoTr, supra note 186, at 47.
242. 434 U.S. at 386.
243. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78-79 (1877).
244. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
245. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
246. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.").
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However, modern developments in American constitutional law
render both of these justifications of marriage as a fundamental right
impermissible. Government regulation of sexual behavior solely for
moral reasons is no longer allowed,
and attempts to use a Christian
natural law justification for marriage as a fundamental right would run
afoul of contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Thus, the
legal principles which initially moved the Court to pronounce a
fundamental right to marry have been completely eroded. Yet the idea
of the fundamental right has lingered, cast adrift from its moorings.248
VI. QUESTIONING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY

We have seen how the Supreme Court instinctively found a
fundamental right to marry and instinctively found the fundamental
right to marry to mean legal-marriage. This jurisprudence, however,
was built upon understandings of law and legal-marriage, which the
Court itself rejected in the line of cases beginning with Griswold and
which had been gradually disintegrating for a century and a half before
Griswold. Can the modern jurisprudence of privacy and personal
autonomy make its own sense of a "fundamental right to marry"? The
different meanings of "marriage" (personal, social, natural-law, legal)
suggest an answer.
A fundamental right to personal-marriage fits easily within the
negative liberty constitutional tradition. The freedom to engage in a
marital relationship, meaning only that the government cannot stop an
individual from doing so, seems natural and intuitive.4 9 A fundamental
right to personal-marriage can summon in its defense many longrecognized constitutional protections (the autonomy of the household;
freedom of speech; liberty to associate with friends of one's choosing;
freedom of conscience) along with more recently-birthed constitutional
protections (for privacy and sexual behavior). Few would argue that the
247. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 571 (2003) ("The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law. 'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code."' (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992))).
248. See generally WITrE, supra note 170, at 15 ("Too much of contemporary society
seems to have lost sight of the rich and diverse Western theological heritage of marriage and
of the uncanny ability of the Western legal tradition to strike new balances between order and
liberty, orthodoxy and innovation with respect to our enduring and evolving sexual and
familial norms and habits.... These ancient sources ultimately hold the theological genetic
code that has defined the contemporary family for what it is ... .
249. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2095-96.
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government should be able to prevent two people from calling
themselves married and behaving according to their understanding of
what personal-marriage means.
As applied to the notion of a fundamental right to marry, popularmarriage has little meaning, referring as it does to a set of beliefs shared
by many people. Two individuals might enter into a personal-marriage
patterned after a popular-marriage template, but this arrangement
would still be a personal-marriage. If it meant anything, a fundamental
right to popular-marriage would mean simply a right to have one's own
views about marriage-certainly a First Amendment right, but nothing
more significant than that. Similarly, a fundamental right to natural-lawmarriage would be nothing more than a First Amendment right. A
natural-law-marriage is an abstract concept; its principles might be
observed by participants in a personal-marriage, but this would still be a
personal-marriage.
As the internal conflicts in the Supreme Court's marriage cases
demonstrate, the idea of a fundamental right to legal-marriage is where
the real puzzle lies.
Loving, Zablocki, and Turner declared a
fundamental right to legal-marry, but did not adequately justify this
pronouncement.
Could they have?
Approaching the problem
systematically, we see there are potentially five different ways to justify
a fundamental right to legal-marriage.
First, there might be a characteristic of legal-marriage itself to which
all persons have a fundamental right-a fundamental right directly to
legal-marriage. Because legal-marriage is defined by the state, it is hard
to see what this would mean. Legal-marriage by itself is empty, a shell
into which the state pours meaning. In theory, legal-marriage could
involve two people or ten; it could require spouses to live together or to
live apart; it could grant spouses intestacy rights or it might say nothing
about intestacy. Without an account of legal-marriage extrinsic to the
whims of the legislature, a direct fundamental right to legal-marriage
means nothing-it is a fundamental right to whatever the legislature
decides to give.25 °
Second, the state might be fundamentally required to give legal250. A fundamental right directly to legal-marriage might make sense if one accepted
that people could have constitutional rights as a group (rather than as a collection of
individuals). A group might claim the right to be treated as a marriage unit by the state
simply by virtue of its groupness. The idea of group rights in marriage, though, was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also Anita Bernstein,
Forand Against Marriage:A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 140 (2003) ("[M]ore than ever,

married people are individuals.").
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marriage treatment to all personal-marriages conforming to a certain
natural-law-marriage. Under this view the state must acknowledge
personal-marriages in conformance with the natural law because the
natural law is superior to the state. This theory, obviously, requires the
authoritative adoption of an account of natural law, something the
Supreme Court is unlikely to do.
Third, one might say there is a fundamental right to have popularmarriage define the boundaries of legal-marriage. However, a belief
does not become a fundamental right merely because some group of
people shares it, so this argument must be a democratic one for it to
make any sense. Perhaps a belief should be considered a fundamental
right if a majority shares it. Yet this theory grants a minority no rights
against the majority because a minority view does not qualify as
something a democratic government must adopt.
Since it has a
majoritarian justification, popular-marriage is not a useful justification
for a fundamental right; fundamental rights are significant because they
212
are counter-majoritarian.
Fourth, one might say the fundamental right to personal-marriage
2
requires legal recognition of all personal-marriages. 53
The key move
here is the idea that any individual personal-marriage must be
recognized also as a legal-marriage, simply because the spouses want it
to be a legal-marriage. Such an assertion demands explanation, though,
and a good reason for it is unavailable. There is no general obligation
for the law to conform itself to an individual's desires. The history of
marriage offers no help; legal-marriage has always been limited in its
availability.
And there is no constitutional obligation for the
government to officially license other kinds of consensual relationships.
Fifth, if a fundamental right to legal-marriage cannot directly be
251. "One thing has changed since 1931: constitutional lawyers have gotten the message,
and the concept [of natural law] is no longer respectable in that context [of constitutional law]
either." ELY, supra note 189, at 52. "The idea [of natural law] is a discredited one in our
society ... and for good reason.... [Y]ou can invoke natural law to support anything you
want." Id. at 50.
252. Unless one posits that a popular-marriage embraced by a minority has claim to
recognition as legal-marriage. For the purpose of this argument, such a popular-marriage is
not really distinguishable from a personal-marriage; its only claim to special status is that
some people believe in it. Accordingly, there is no need to consider such a popular-marriage
separately from the consideration of personal-marriage below.
253. See Greene, supra note 49, at 1996 ("[Turner] demonstrates, therefore, that
marriage is fundamental under the U.S. Constitution not because it provides a setting for
heterosexual procreation but because it solemnizes a social relationship that individuals
regard as fundamentally important."). Cf Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
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shown, perhaps it can be shown indirectly. That is, perhaps there exists
a separate fundamental right which itself entails legal-marriage. Thus,
(1) There exists fundamental right X
(2) X requires legal-marriage
(3) Therefore, there exists a fundamental right to legalmarriage
One such argument which has been made fills in X with "being
treated by the government as a human being," so that we have: (1) all
people have the fundamental right to be treated as humans by the state;
(2) the right to legal-marriage is an inherent part of being human; (3)
therefore, all people have the fundamental right to be allowed to legalmarry in the eyes of the state. 254 Considering current popular-marriage
views in conjunction with the treatment-as-a-human argument appears
to strengthen it. If most people believe that legal-marriage is a right that
accrues simply from being a person, then denying marriage to someone
seems like denying their humanity.
However, a little probing demonstrates that this argument fails to
show that legal-marriage is a fundamental right. Assume that (1) is true;
all people have the fundamental right to be treated as human by the
state. This leaves two questions: (i) is legal-marriage inherently part of
being treated as human by the state? (ii) if so, what shape must legalmarriage take, and why? Question (i) is contestable; those who value
legal-marriage might say access to it is a vital part of human existence,
while those who think legal-marriage oppressive might say it is harmful
to one's humanity. One might embark on extended philosophical and
sociological theorizing to justify the claim that entering into legalmarriage is an inherent part of being human. Sidestepping that question
and accepting arguendo that the answer to (i) is yes, though, all we have
accomplished is to arrive back at the original question: what shape must
legal-marriage take in order for being human to require it, and why?
The answer to this question can only come from a philosophical account
of what being human means-a question the Court has found the

254. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 49, at 1218 ("A society that fails to recognize the
relationships and families of lesbians and gay men is a society that fails to respect their
personal dignity and full humanity."); CoTr, supra note 186, at 1 ("At the same time that any
marriage represents personal love and commitment, it participates in the public order.
Marital status is just as important to one's standing in the community and state as it is to selfunderstanding.").
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Constitution to leave open to individuals to decide for themselves.255
There is a strong counterargument to any such detailed account of being
human, no matter how carefully constructed: "I have different beliefs
about the meaning of legal-marriage and about the relationship of legalmarriage and being human, and the Constitution does not support your
view any more than it does mine."
Another way of seeing this is to realize that legal-marriage might
have multiple necessary components; simply being a person need not
guarantee that one can marry. If legal-marriage requires you to be
human and fulfill the requirements A, B, and C, then if John is unable to
legal-marry, it could be because he fails A, B, or C-there is no
necessary inference about whether the law is treating him as a person or
not. Which A, B, and C are permissible requirements for legalmarriage? Unless one arbitrarily imposes an account of legal-marriage
whose boundaries are defined by an extra-constitutional source, these
questions cannot be answered by reference to a "fundamental right to
marry."
One last objection remains. Even if no principled account of the
boundaries of a fundamental right to legal-marry is available, perhaps
the vague concept of a fundamental right to legal-marry is still useful.
Perhaps such a fundamental right prevents a majority from defining
marriage so that it is only available to the majority. That is, a majoritybelieving legal-marriage is a good thing-should not be allowed to
create a legal-marriage regime which maliciously excludes a minority
group. The classic example of this injustice was laws restricting the
ability of racial minorities to marry.2 5 6
However, this argument is based upon equal protection notions, not
any unique property of marriage as a fundamental right. A majority
should not be able to irrationally deny a minority equal access to any
legal structure, whether it be marriage, the incorporation of a company,
or a passport. None of these need be considered fundamental rights for
the Constitution to prevent a majority from unfairly administering them.
Introducing vague notions of an indeterminate fundamental right to

255. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371 (1971).
256. Such laws worked either by refusing to recognize as legal-marriage the same
arrangments among members of the minority that would be recognized as legal-marriage
among members of the majority, or by refusing to recognize as legal-marriage arrangements
between a member of the minority and a member of the majority. Such laws played
significant roles in the tragic American experience with slavery. "The denial of legal marriage
to slaves quintessentially expressed their lack of civil rights. To marry meant to consent, and
slaves could not exercise the fundamental capacity to consent." Co'rr, supra note 186, at 33.
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marry adds nothing to the analysis; it merely obscures the main point
and creates extraneous constitutional doctrine to confuse future cases
involving marriage.
. To make a fundamental right to legal-marry matter, one must posit
that there is a core meaning to "marry" that the state cannot alter. Yet
there is no core meaning of marriage that can be justified in our
constitutional scheme. If legal-marriage is defined by the state, a
fundamental right to legal-marry is meaningless. If legal-marriage is
defined by majority rule, a fundamental right to legal-marry offers no
protection, of itself, for a minority. If legal-marriage is defined by a law
higher than the Constitution, the Supreme Court must tell us what that
law is. And saying that legal-marriage must include all individual
personal-marriages is silly; there is no constitutional right for an
individual to have the law as it applies to them say whatever they want it
to say.
If required to do so, judges can decide on a case-by-case basis
whether specific state marital regulations qualify as constitutionally
"reasonable." But "reasonable" as applied to legal-marriage will have
very different meanings depending on who is deciding. In the face of
constitutional right-to-marry indeterminacy, the suspicion inevitably
arises that judicial decisions about the constitutional boundaries of
marriage are not so much the result of orderly constitutional mandates
as they are the channeling of judicial policy preferences whispering, "I
think people should behave in manner x, so the fundamental right to
marry must mean y, regardless of how many people disagree. ,257
VII. ESCAPING THE CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE CONUNDRUM
There does not seem to exist an adequate justification for
considering legal-marriage a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution, and no principled account of the boundaries of legalmarriage is available. How can the jurisprudence be fixed to reflect this
reality, while doing as little damage to constitutional precedents as
possible?
The earlier breaking down of the umbrella term "marriage" into
various more specific meanings, coupled -with the "negative rights"
nature of the rest of the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence,
257. See ELY, supra note 189, at 56-60. "The objection to 'reason' as a source of
fundamental values is therefore best stated in the alternative: either it is an empty
source.., or, if not empty, it is so flagrantly elitist and undemocratic that it should be
dismissed forthwith." Id. at 59.
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suggests an answer. As noted above, a fundamental right to personalmarriage-specific individual, private marital arrangements-fits
comfortably within the negative rights nature of the recognized
fundamental rights (like the right to raise and educate one's children as
one pleases and the right to use contraceptives),258 Thus, a fundamental
right to personal-marriage would forbid the government from
interfering with the decisions of individuals to form arrangements they
deemed marriages, though it would allow the states to create boundaries
for legal-marriage however they deemed best (within the constraints of
other constitutional guarantees, like the Equal Protection Clause).259
Of course, this strategy only kicks the problem of defining
constitutional protections for marriage down a level; how far can
someone stretch their own personal-marriage boundaries and still
receive constitutional protection? However, this question is similar to
other questions the Court regularly answers: how far does any negative
liberty right extend, whether the right to educate one's children or the
right to speak freely? This is territory in which judicial decisions often
prevent government action but in which they rarely force government
action.
The difference is significant. Court decisions to force
government action initiate confrontation between the legislative and
judicial branches, while decisions preventing government action usually
happen in response to controversies initiated by the legislative or
executive branches. Further, since judicial decisions about negative
liberties prevent state action, they often do not need to precisely
describe the boundaries of the liberty; they may merely say a particular
state action lies on the wrong side of the line. There is accordingly less
pressure on the Court to be specific and aligned with public opinion
258. In contrast, a fundamental right to legal-marriage would decidedly not fit the larger
pattern.
Because the Supreme Court has long rejected demands for affirmative
entitlements cast as constitutional rights-among them health care,
government-funded abortion, and education at a state-mandated level of
quality-the Court cannot rely on its precedents to recognize a
constitutional right to be married in the eyes of the law.
Bernstein, supra note 250, at 143. Cf Ball, supra note 49, at 1204 ("[E]ven if the Due Process
Clause primarily protects negative rights, the fundamental right to marry stands as an
important exception.").
259. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("The power of the States over marriage and divorce is, of course, complete except as limited
by specific constitutional provisions."); id. at 389 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Absent some
specific federal constitutional or statutory provision, marriage in this country is completely
under state control, and so is divorce.").
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when it prevents government action than when the Court forces
legislative or executive bodies to act in ways they do not wish to act.
There are several themes in the existing constitutional jurisprudence
of marriage that support reinterpreting the fundamental right to marry
to mean personal-marriage. The Court's assertion in Griswold that
marriage precedes the state is nonsensical as applied to legal-marriage,
but an obvious statement of historical fact as applied to personalmarriage. The state is already prevented (under normal circumstances)
from interfering with practices commonly associated with personalmarriage (childrearing, living arrangements, sexual behavior) but has
long been understood to have power to fix the consequences of legalRemoving legalmarriage (inheritance, divorce, child support).
marriage from the domain of the fundamental right to marry explains
how the venerable doctrine of common law marriage-which
occasionally results in the imposition of legal-marriage on a couple
against their wishes-can be constitutional.
Similarly, there are themes in the existing constitutional
jurisprudence of legal-marriage which are inconsistent with legalmarriage being a fundamental right. The Lutwak decision's explicit
rejection of several "legal marriages" as qualifying for favorable
immigration treatment fits better with the idea of legal-marriage as a
tool of state social policy than it does with legal-marriage as a
fundamental right the state is bound to respect. Longstanding bans on
polygamy do not fit well with the idea that rights may be exercised by
the individual as broadly and as often as he or she desires.
There are significant theoretical advantages associated with
considering the right to marry as applying to personal-marriage rather
than "legal marriage." This approach is internally coherent-it does not
rely on discarded (by the courts) religious beliefs about legal-marriage
to justify a fundamental rights claim. It is an externally coherent
approach-it fits easily with the Court's treatment of other fundamental
260. The fundamental right to marry implies the fundamental right to be not married.
See id. at 380-83 (majority opinion). Yet common law marriage allowed a state to impose
marriage on a cohabiting person against his or her will.
A New York man, for example, who tried to sever informally his
relationship with his long-time cohabitant found that he needed to go to
court to do so, because the couple had spent a few nights in the common
law marriage states of Georgia and South Carolina while on a motor trip
to Disney World.
GLENDON, supra note 17, at 278 (citing Kellard v. Kellard, 13 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1490

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)).
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rights by framing the "right to marry" as a negative right and by
emphasizing the family life/privacy aspect of marriage. And it allows
the state flexibility as it tries to design legal institutions that will
maximize social welfare.26 '
The interpretation of the "right to marry" as meaning personalmarriage also allows courts to avoid taking sides in the cultural debate
over the meaning of legal-marriage. A court decision establishing legalmarriage as X and then authoritatively calling this the "fundamental
right to marry" has the effect of closing off debate and handing victory
to one side-potentially in the minority-without it necessarily
convincing a majority that its view of marriage is the best. In a society
with democratic ideals, this is undesirable, especially because the court's
imposed definition will then begin to conform public opinion to itself.
The biggest problem with reinterpreting the fundamental right to
marry as meaning personal-marriage has three names: Loving, Zablocki,
and Turner. However, these obstacles are not as daunting as they might
appear. All three could be easily re-read, without outright overruling, in
a way that would not establish legal-marriage as the fundamental right
to marry. The language about legal-marriage being a fundamental right
in Loving was completely unnecessary to the holding of the case; equal
protection doctrine alone required the Loving outcome. The Court in
Zablocki mentioned that the plaintiff's right to marry could arise from
the combination of his right to procreate and the illegality under
Wisconsin law of doing so without being married; one might reasonably
confine the significance of the case to those facts, which seem unlikely to
recur in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas. And Turner could be reread, as
Justice Thomas suggested in Overton v. Bazzetta, merely as saying that
withholding the right to marry was not part of Safley's statutory
sentence.262

261. See generally Hafen, supra note 138, at 510 ("The implications of classifying the
right to marry on the extreme individual rights end of the spectrum of constitutional
protections do not bode well for permitting careful analysis of the relationship between
individual and social interests in this most basic of social institutions-unless, of course, the
Court adopts a test that weighs those two interests as part of the process of determining
whether a 'liberty' interest is present in the first place.").
262. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 140 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) ("Turner is therefore best thought of as implicitly deciding that the marriage
restriction was not within the scope of the State's lawfully imposed sentence and that,
therefore, the regulation worked a deprivation of a constitutional right without sufficient
process.").

2006]

QUESTIONING THE RIGHT TO MARRY
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of the fundamental right
to marry. However, this doctrine has several problems: (a) the Court
never satisfactorily explains why marriage is a fundamental right; (b) the
Court never defines the boundaries of marriage as a fundamental right;
(c) the Court has occasionally treated marriage as if it were not a
fundamental right; and (d) the Court has long said that states have
broad powers to regulate marriage.
Commentary (including court decisions) on marriage often refers to
"marriage" as if its meaning is obvious, but the word "marriage" carries
several different denotations. It can refer to a personal relationship, a
popular understanding of a type of relationship, a religiously or
philosophically defined type of relationship, or a legal category. These
denotations overlap because each one affects our understanding of the
others, but they are conceptually distinct.
The idea of a fundamental right to marry, by which the Court has
meant legal-marry, arose out of historically based natural law beliefs
about sexuality and marriage. These beliefs provided principled
boundaries for a fundamental right to marry. However, the Court's
modern jurisprudence renders those understandings no longer tenable
as the basis for constitutional law, and no other principled manner of
justifying or deriving boundaries for a fundamental right to legal-marry
is available under the modern regime.
The best solution to this dilemma is for the Court to reinterpret the
fundamental right to marry as referring to a fundamental right to
personal-marriage. This would preserve the entrenched idea of a
fundamental right to marry while cohering with the negative liberty
nature of the Court's other recognized fundamental rights and
accommodating the reality that the Constitution does not (currently)
textually define or even mention marriage of any kind.
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